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Abstract
We examine empirically how the supply and maturity structure of government debt aﬀect
bond yields and expected returns. We organize our investigation around a term-structure model
in which risk-averse arbitrageurs absorb shocks to the demand and supply for bonds of diﬀerent
maturities. These shocks aﬀect the term structure because they alter the price of duration risk.
Consistent with the model, we ﬁnd that the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio is positively
related to bond yields and future returns, controlling for the short rate. Moreover, these eﬀects
are stronger for longer-maturity bonds and following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money.
We use our empirical estimates to calibrate the model.
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How do the supply and maturity structure of government debt aﬀect interest rates? If, for example,
the government raises the supply of long-term bonds, would this raise the spread between long and
short rates? According to standard representative-agent models, there should be no eﬀect because
of Ricardian equivalence (Barro (1974)). Intuitively, the consumption of the representative agent,
and hence interest rates, depend on government spending but not on how spending is ﬁnanced.
The irrelevance result is at odds with a view held by many policy makers and emphasized in
early term-structure theories. According to the portfolio-balance theory (e.g., Tobin 1958,1969),
investors would be willing to absorb an increased supply of long-term bonds, and hence bear more
risk, only if they were compensated by an increase in long rates relative to short rates. According
to the preferred-habitat theory (e.g., Culbertson 1957, Modigliani and Sutch 1966), an increased
supply of long-term bonds would mainly be absorbed by a clientele of long-horizon investors. Long
rates would increase, while short rates, mainly determined by short-horizon investors, might not
be aﬀected.
Determining empirically how the supply and maturity structure of government debt aﬀect inter-
est rates is important for informing the theory of the term structure, especially given the conﬂicting
predictions. An empirical investigation of supply eﬀects is also relevant from a policy viewpoint.
For example, during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, central banks around the world conducted unprece-
dented open-market purchases of intermediate- and long-term government bonds. Drawing on the
portfolio-balance and preferred-habitat theories, the central banks hoped that their purchases, also
known as quantitative easing, would lower long-term interest rates and stimulate private investment.
In this paper we use time-series data to examine how the supply and maturity structure of
government debt aﬀect government bond yields and expected returns in the U.S. We organize our
investigation around a term-structure model in which risk-averse arbitrageurs absorb shocks to the
demand and supply for bonds of diﬀerent maturities. The model predicts that an increase in supply
should raise bond yields and expected returns, holding the short rate constant. Moreover, these
eﬀects should be stronger for longer-maturity bonds and during times when arbitrageurs are more
risk averse. The data support these predictions. Using our empirical estimates of supply eﬀects,
we calibrate the model and infer arbitrageur risk aversion.
Our theory builds on the preferred-habitat model of Vayanos and Vila (2009). We simplify that
model by assuming that the demand and supply for each maturity in the absence of arbitrageurs are
price-inelastic. The resulting model captures the portfolio-balance eﬀect but abstracts away from
clienteles and preferred habitats since the only agents absorbing shocks are identical arbitrageurs.
Changes in supply in our model aﬀect bond yields and expected returns because they change
1the amount of interest-rate risk, or “duration risk,” borne by arbitrageurs. For example, to ac-
commodate an increase in the supply of long-term bonds, arbitrageurs must absorb more duration
risk, and hence require all bonds in their portfolio to oﬀer higher expected returns in excess of the
short rate. As a consequence, prices go down for all bonds, and yields and expected returns go up.
This holds even when the increase in the supply of long-term bonds is accompanied by an equal
decrease in the supply of short-term bonds. Indeed, since long-term bonds are more sensitive to
duration risk than short-term bonds, arbitrageurs must absorb more such risk. Therefore, prices
go down for all bonds, including for short-term ones whose supply decreases.
We assume that supply is described by one stochastic factor, and allow the loadings on that
factor to diﬀer across maturities in both magnitude and sign. For example, increases in the supply
factor could correspond to increases in the supply of long-term bonds and decreases in the supply
of short-term bonds. We also assume, as a normalization and without loss of generality, that
increases in the supply factor correspond to increases in duration-weighted supply. Therefore,
when the supply factor increases, so do the yields and expected returns of all bonds, holding the
short rate constant.
Increases in the supply factor have stronger eﬀects when arbitrageurs are more risk averse.
Moreover, the eﬀects on expected returns are stronger for long-term bonds than for short-term
bonds. This is because long-term bonds are more sensitive to duration risk, and hence to changes
in the price of that risk. Finally, the eﬀects of supply on yields are increasing or hump-shaped across
maturities, and are smaller than on expected returns. Both results follow from the property that the
eﬀect of a supply shock on a bond’s yield is equal to the average eﬀect on the bond’s instantaneous
expected return over the bond’s life. This average eﬀect can be stronger for an intermediate-term
bond than for a long-term bond if the shock mean-reverts quickly. It is also smaller than the eﬀect
on the bond’s current expected return for two reasons. Since the shock mean-reverts, its eﬀect on
the expected return of all bonds dies down over time. And even in the absence of mean reversion,
the shock’s eﬀect on the expected return of any given bond decreases over time. This is because
the bond’s time to maturity decreases and so does the bond’s sensitivity to changes in the price of
duration risk.
We test the predictions of our model using data on the U.S. Treasury market from 1952-2007.
For every bond, CRSP maintains a record of bond characteristics (e.g., coupon rate and maturity)
as well as monthly observations of face value outstanding. Using these data, we compute the
maturity structure of aggregate payments on government debt. We also compute a dollar duration
of these payments by multiplying each payment by the corresponding maturity and summing across
maturities. We use this dollar duration as our main measure of supply, as suggested by our model,
scale it by GDP, and term it the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio. Maturity-weighted debt
2to GDP is approximately the product of debt to GDP times the average maturity of debt.
We regress yields and future returns on our supply measure, controlling for the one-year yield
which we use as a proxy for the short rate. Consistent with our model, we ﬁnd that supply
is positively related to yields and future returns. The eﬀects are statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in our main measure of supply raises
the yield on a long-term bond with approximate maturity twenty years by 40 basis points (bps) and
its expected return over a one-year horizon by 259bps. We ﬁnd evidence in support of the other
predictions of our model as well. The eﬀects of supply on yields and expected returns are increasing
with maturity, and the eﬀects on yields are smaller than on expected returns. Moreover, using a
measure of arbitrageur wealth implied by our model, we ﬁnd that both supply and the slope of the
term structure become stronger predictors of future returns when arbitrageur wealth is low.
We subject our empirical results to a number of robustness tests, two of which deserve particular
mention. First, we extend the time-series by collecting additional data on the supply and maturity
structure of government debt in a pre-war 1916-1940 sample. The results in that sample are
broadly similar to those in our main sample. Second, we address the concern that supply might be
endogenous. For example, the government might choose maturity structure to cater to ﬂuctuations
in investor demand, mitigating and potentially even reversing any positive relationship that would
otherwise obtain between supply and yields or expected returns. We instrument maturity-weighted
debt to GDP by marketable Treasury debt to GDP. This is a suitable instrument because it is
correlated with maturity-weighted debt to GDP, while also being driven mostly by the cumulation
of past deﬁcits rather than by changes in investor demand. In the instrumental-variables regressions,
the eﬀect of supply on expected returns remains statistically signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcients are
almost identical to their OLS counterparts.
Last, we calibrate our model to the data. We estimate parameters for the processes governing
the short rate and the supply factor. We also estimate how supply at each maturity loads on
the supply factor. Combining these with our estimates of supply eﬀects on yields and expected
returns, we infer a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) for the arbitrageurs. We ﬁnd that
this coeﬃcient is 57 times the ratio of arbitrageur wealth to GDP. This yields a range from 7.6 in
the case where shocks to the supply of government debt are absorbed only by hedge funds, to 91.2
in the case where private pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds are equally active
in absorbing the supply shocks.
A number of papers measure supply eﬀects by analyzing the behavior of bond yields around
speciﬁc policy events. Such events include Operation Twist, a program undertaken by the U.S.
Treasury and Federal Reserve during 1962-1964 with the objective to shorten the average maturity
of government debt (e.g., Modigliani and Sutch 1966, Ross 1966, Wallace 1967, Swanson 2011), the
32000-2002 buybacks by the U.S. Treasury, undertaken with a similar objective (e.g., Garbade and
Rutherford 2007, Greenwood and Vayanos 2010), and the recent QE programs in the U.S. (e.g.,
Gagnon et al. 2011, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011, D’Amico et al. 2012, D’Amico
and King 2013) and the U.K. (e.g., Joyce et al 2011).1 An advantage of such event studies is
that because the exact dates of policy events are known, it is easier to map changes in supply to
changes in yields. At the same time, these events can sometimes be confounded by news about
future monetary policy or the broader economy, or can occur during times when arbitrageur capital
is limited (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011).
Simon (1991,1994), Duﬀee (1996) and Fleming (2002) document supply eﬀects in the cross
section of Treasury Bills by correlating the supply of individual bills with the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of their yields. Fleming and Rosenberg (2007) ﬁnd that Treasury dealers are compensated
by high excess returns when holding large inventories of newly issued Treasury securities. Lou et
al. (2013) document that prices of Treasury securities drop before issuance dates and then rebound
predictably. We focus instead on eﬀects at a more aggregate scale and a lower frequency.
Reinhart and Sack (2000) and Dai and Philippon (2006) ﬁnd that government deﬁcits raise
the spread between long- and short-term interest rates. The latter paper also shows that the
eﬀect occurs partly through an increase in the risk premia of long-term bonds. Kuttner (2006)
ﬁnds that shifts in Federal Reserve holdings of government debt towards long maturities lower the
risk premia of two-, three-, four- and ﬁve-year bonds. We examine instead how a theoretically
motivated measure of the supply of Treasury debt, which includes both the level of debt and its
average maturity, aﬀects bond yields and expected returns. Beyond these ﬁndings, we also test for
predictions of our model on how supply eﬀects should manifest themselves in the cross-section and
the time-series.2
Hamilton and Wu (2012) structurally estimate a discretized version of Vayanos and Vila (VV
2009) and derive measures of supply which they then use to predict returns in the 1990-2007
sample. Li and Wei (2012) estimate an aﬃne term-structure model with macro-economic factors
and two explicit supply factors, imposing some of the structure suggested by VV. The estimates
of supply eﬀects from these papers are broadly consistent with ours. Other papers that employ a
similar theoretical framework include Hanson (2012) and Malkhozov et al. (2013), who examine
how changes in the duration of mortgage-backed securities arising from prepayment options aﬀect
yields and expected returns, and Hong et al. (2013), who examine how the eﬀects of supply in the
1See also Bernanke et al. (2004) for a broader analysis of QE programs, and Joyce et al. (2012) for a survey of
the theoretical and empirical literature on QE.
2Some papers document price eﬀects of demand rather than of supply. See, for example, Park and Reinganum
(1986), Ogden (1987), Fernald et al. (1994), Kambhu and Mosser (2001), Sierra (2010), and Baker and Wurgler
(2012).
4Treasury market interact with those of disagreement about future inﬂation.
Longstaﬀ (2004) ﬁnds that U.S. Treasury bonds trade at a high price premium relative to bonds
issued by Refcorp, a U.S. government agency, during those months of the 2000-2002 buybacks when
the Treasury made large purchases. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) ﬁnd that when
government bonds are in small supply, i.e., debt to GDP is low, they trade at a high price premium
relative to AAA-rated corporate bonds. The ﬁndings of these papers suggest that clienteles and
preferred habitats can exist not only within the Treasury market but also between Treasuries and
other markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework
and derives the empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our measures of supply.
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 calibrates our model to the data, and Section 6
concludes. The proofs of the theoretical results, as well as some supplementary tables and other
data material, are in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Predictions
A theoretical framework helps organize our empirical investigation of supply eﬀects on the term
structure. The theory builds on the preferred-habitat model of Vayanos and Vila (VV 2009), in
which arbitrageurs absorb shocks to the demand and supply for bonds of diﬀerent maturities.
Arbitrageurs integrate the markets for diﬀerent maturities, rendering the term structure arbitrage-
free. Because, however, they are risk averse, demand and supply shocks aﬀect bond prices. We
focus on the two-factor version of VV, with a short-rate and a supply factor, and simplify the
model by assuming that the demand and supply for each maturity in the absence of arbitrageurs
are price-inelastic. This allows us to derive closed-form solutions and compute the equilibrium for
a broader range of parameters than VV. Using the closed-form solutions, we determine how the
supply of government debt aﬀects bond prices, and derive our empirical hypotheses.
2.1 Model
The model is set in continuous time. The term structure at time t consists of a continuum of
zero-coupon bonds with maturities in the interval (0,T] and face value one. We denote by P
()
t the
price of the bond with maturity τ at time t, and by y
()
t the bond’s yield (i.e., the spot rate for
5maturity τ). The yield is related to the price through
y
()
t = −
logP
()
t
τ
. (1)
We denote by rt the short rate, which is the limit of y
()
t when τ goes to zero.
Bonds are issued by a government and are traded by arbitrageurs and other investors. We model
explicitly only the arbitrageurs, and treat the demand and supply coming out of the government
and the other investors as exogenous and price-inelastic. We assume that arbitrageurs choose a
bond portfolio to trade oﬀ the instantaneous mean and variance of changes in wealth. Denoting
their time-t wealth by Wt and their dollar investment in the bond with maturity τ by x
()
t , their
budget constraint is
dWt =
∫ T
0
x
()
t
dP
()
t
P
()
t
dτ +
(
Wt −
∫ T
0
x
()
t dτ
)
rtdt. (2)
The ﬁrst term in (2) is the arbitrageurs’ return from investing in bonds, and the second term is
their return from investing their remaining wealth in the short rate. The arbitrageurs’ optimization
problem is
max
{x
()
t }∈(0;T]
[
Et(dWt) −
a
2
V art(dWt)
]
, (3)
where a is a risk-aversion coeﬃcient. One interpretation of the preferences in (3) is that arbitrageurs
form overlapping generations, each of which starts with the same level of wealth, lives for a short
period, and maximizes expected utility of ﬁnal wealth. Introducing long-lived arbitrageurs would
complicate the optimization problem. Wealth would generally become a state variable, and arbi-
trageurs could have a hedging demand in addition to the myopic one generated by (3). Within our
simple speciﬁcation (3), we can derive wealth eﬀects as comparative statics by identifying changes
in wealth with changes in a. We can also introduce a hedging motive by allowing arbitrageurs to
care not only about mean and variance but also about the covariance between changes in wealth and
the risk factors. In Appendix B.1 we show that the hedging demand generated by this covariance
does not aﬀect our main results.
We assume that the net supply coming out of the government and the other investors is described
by a one-factor model: the dollar value of the bond with maturity τ supplied to arbitrageurs at
6time t is
s
()
t = ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt, (4)
where ζ(τ) and θ(τ) are deterministic functions of τ, and βt is a stochastic supply factor. The
factor βt follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dβt = −κβtdt + σdB;t, (5)
where κ > 0 and σ > 0 are constants, and B;t is a Brownian motion. The assumption σ > 0
is without loss of generality since we can switch the sign of B;t.
Since the supply factor βt has mean zero, the function ζ(τ) measures the average supply for
maturity τ. The function θ(τ) measures the sensitivity of that supply to βt. We assume that θ(τ)
has the following properties.
Assumption 1. The function θ(τ) satisﬁes:
(i)
∫ T
0 θ(τ)dτ ≥ 0.
(ii) There exists τ∗ ∈ [0,T) such that θ(τ) < 0 for τ < τ∗ and θ(τ) > 0 for τ > τ∗.
Part (i) of Assumption 1 requires that an increase in βt does not decrease the total dollar value
of bonds supplied to arbitrageurs. This is without loss of generality since we can switch the sign of
βt. Part (ii) of Assumption 1 allows for the possibility that the supply for some maturities decreases
when βt increases, even though the total supply does not decrease. The maturities for which supply
can decrease are restricted to be at the short end of the term structure. As we show in Section 2.3,
Parts (i) and (ii) together ensure that an increase in βt makes the portfolio that arbitrageurs hold
in equilibrium more sensitive to movements in the short rate. This increase in sensitivity is what
generates a positive eﬀect of βt on yields and expected returns.
Assumption 1 includes many cases of interest. One polar case is that an increase in βt increases
supply for each maturity and hence total supply. This case can be derived by setting the threshold
τ∗ to zero so that θ(τ) > 0 for all τ. Another polar case is that an increase in βt leaves total supply
constant, but only shifts weight from short maturities to long maturities. This case can be derived
by setting
∫ T
0 θ(τ)dτ to zero.
We treat the short rate rt as exogenous, but motivated in part by the data, allow it to depend
on the supply factor βt. We assume that rt follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
drt = κr(¯ r − rt − γβt)dt + σrdBr;t + σrdB;t, (6)
7where ¯ r, κr > 0, σr > 0, γ, σr are constants, and Br;t is a Brownian motion independent of B;t.
The assumption σr > 0 is without loss of generality since we can switch the sign of Br;t. The
constants γ and σr introduce correlation between rt and βt. We mainly focus on the case where
rt and βt are independent, thus setting γ = σr = 0, because the independent case is simple and
yields the main intuitions. We sketch the analysis of the correlated case at the end of Section 2.3.
2.2 Equilibrium Term Structure
The two risk factors in our model are the short rate rt and the supply factor βt. We next examine
how shocks to these factors inﬂuence the bond prices P
()
t that are endogenously determined in
equilibrium. We solve for equilibrium in two steps: ﬁrst solve the arbitrageurs’ optimization problem
for equilibrium bond prices of a conjectured form, and second use market clearing to verify the
conjectured form of prices. We conjecture that equilibrium bond yields are aﬃne functions of the
risk factors. Bond prices thus take the form
P
()
t = e−[Ar()rt+A()t+C()] (7)
for three functions Ar(τ), A(τ) and C(τ) that depend on maturity τ. The functions Ar(τ) and
A(τ) characterize the sensitivity of bond prices to the short rate rt and the supply factor βt,
respectively, where sensitivity is deﬁned as the percentage price drop per unit of factor increase.
Applying Ito’s Lemma to (7) and using the dynamics of βt and rt in (5) and (6) for γ = σr = 0,
we ﬁnd that the instantaneous return of the bond with maturity τ is
dP
()
t
P
()
t
= µ
()
t dt − Ar(τ)σrdBr;t − A(τ)σdB;t, (8)
where
µ
()
t ≡ A′
r(τ)rt+A′
(τ)βt+C′(τ)+Ar(τ)κr(rt−¯ r)+A(τ)κβt+
1
2
Ar(τ)2σ2
r +
1
2
A(τ)2σ2
 (9)
denotes the instantaneous expected return. Substituting bond returns (8) into the arbitrageurs’
budget constraint (2), we can solve the arbitrageurs’ optimization problem (3).
Lemma 1. The arbitrageurs’ ﬁrst-order condition is
µ
()
t − rt = Ar(τ)λr;t + A(τ)λ;t, (10)
8where for i = r,β,
λi;t ≡ aσ2
i
∫ T
0
x
()
t Ai(τ)dτ. (11)
According to (10), a bond’s instantaneous expected return in excess of the short rate, µ
()
t −rt,
is a linear function of the bond’s sensitivities Ar(τ) to the short rate and A(τ) to the supply
factor. The coeﬃcients λr;t and λ;t of the linear function (which are the same for all bonds) are
the prices of short-rate and supply risk, respectively. These coeﬃcients measure the expected excess
return per unit of sensitivity to each factor. While we derive (10) from the optimization problem
of arbitrageurs with mean-variance preferences, this equation is a more general consequence of the
absence of arbitrage: the expected excess return per unit of factor sensitivity must be the same for
all bonds, otherwise it would be possible to construct arbitrage portfolios.
Absence of arbitrage imposes essentially no restrictions on the prices of risk λr;t and λ;t. We
determine these instead from market clearing. Eq. (11) shows that the price of risk λi;t for factor
i = r,β depends on the overall sensitivity
∫ T
0 x
()
t Ai(τ)dτ of arbitrageurs’ portfolio to that factor.
Intuitively, if arbitrageurs are highly exposed to a factor, they require that any asset they hold
yields high expected return per unit of factor sensitivity. The portfolio that arbitrageurs hold in
equilibrium is determined from the market-clearing condition
x
()
t = s
()
t , (12)
which equates the arbitrageurs’ dollar investment x
()
t in the bond with maturity τ to the bond’s
dollar supply s
()
t . Substituting µ
()
t and x
()
t from (4), (9) and (12) into (10), we ﬁnd an aﬃne
equation in rt and βt. Setting linear terms in rt and βt to zero yields two ordinary diﬀerential
equations (ODEs) in Ar(τ) and A(τ), respectively. Setting constant terms to zero yields an
additional ODE in C(τ). We solve the three ODEs in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The functions Ar(τ) and A(τ) are given by
Ar(τ) =
1 − e−r
κr
, (13)
A(τ) =
Z
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
, (14)
9respectively, where
Z ≡ aσ2
rIr,
Ir ≡
∫ T
0
1 − e−r
κr
θ(τ)dτ, (15)
and ˆ κ solves
ˆ κ = κ − a2σ2
rσ2
Ir
∫ T
0
1
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
θ(τ)dτ. (16)
Eq. (16) has a solution if a is below a threshold ¯ a > 0. The function C(τ) is given by (A.10) in
Appendix A.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we show that (16) has an even number of solutions, possibly zero. If
the number of solutions is zero, then equilibria with aﬃne yields fail to exist. Otherwise, equilibria
exist and are in even number. The mechanism causing the multiplicity is reminiscent of that in
DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990) and Spiegel (1998). If yields are highly sensitive
to shocks to the supply risk factor βt, then bonds become highly risky for arbitrageurs. Hence,
arbitrageurs absorb supply shocks only if they are compensated by large changes in yields, making
the high sensitivity of yields to shocks self-fulﬁlling.
Equilibria exist if the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coeﬃcient a is below a threshold ¯ a > 0. We
focus on that case, and select the equilibrium corresponding to the largest solution of (16). This
equilibrium is well behaved in the sense that when a converges to zero, it converges to the unique
equilibrium that exists for a = 0.
2.3 Eﬀects of Debt Supply
We next derive the implications of Theorem 1 for how shocks to the supply factor βt aﬀect yields
and expected returns. We derive our empirical hypotheses from these implications.
Proposition 1 (Supply and Yields). A shock to the supply factor βt moves the yields of all
bonds in the same direction as the shock. Moreover, the eﬀect is either increasing or hump-shaped
across maturities.
Proposition 2 (Supply and Expected Returns). A shock to the supply factor βt moves the
instantaneous expected returns of all bonds in the same direction as the shock. Moreover, the eﬀect
is increasing across maturities.
10That an increase in supply raises the yields and instantaneous expected returns of all bonds
appears intuitive: the price of a bond must drop so that risk-averse arbitrageurs are induced to hold
the bond’s increased supply. Implicit in this explanation, however, is that the increase in supply
concerns all bonds. Our deﬁnition of the supply factor is more general: Assumption 1 requires that
an increase in the supply factor corresponds to a (weak) increase in total supply, but allows for the
possibility that the supply of short-term bonds decreases.
Why do the prices of short-term bonds decrease when their supply decreases? A bond’s price
and supply can move in the same direction because supply eﬀects do not operate locally, but
globally through changes in the prices of risk. Local eﬀects are made global through the activity
of arbitrageurs, who integrate the markets for diﬀerent maturities. Following an increase in the
supply factor, the portfolio that arbitrageurs hold in equilibrium becomes more sensitive to changes
in the short rate. This is so even when the supply of short-term bonds decreases because overall
supply (weakly) increases and long-term bonds are more sensitive to changes in the short rate than
short-term bonds. Because arbitrageurs become more exposed to short-rate risk, they become less
willing to bear that risk, and that risk’s price increases. Since all bonds load positively on short-rate
risk, in the sense of experiencing a price drop when the short rate increases, their instantaneous
expected return increases. Therefore, the price of all bonds—both short- and long-term—decreases
and their yield increases.3
The increase in instantaneous expected returns is largest for long-term bonds because they are
the most sensitive to risk. The increase in yields, however, can be larger for intermediate-term
bonds than for long-term bonds. Intuitively, the eﬀect of a supply shock on a bond’s yield is equal
to the average eﬀect on the bond’s instantaneous expected return over the bond’s life. This average
eﬀect can be largest for intermediate-term bonds if the shock mean-reverts quickly. Regardless of
mean-reversion, however, supply shocks have small eﬀects on the yields and expected returns of
short-term bonds. Intuitively, short-term bonds are close substitutes to investing in the short rate,
and arbitrageurs can tie their yields closely to current and expected future short rates.
The eﬀect of supply on instantaneous expected returns, derived in Proposition 2, is larger than
the eﬀect on yields, derived in Proposition 1. This follows from the property that the eﬀect of a
supply shock on a bond’s yield is equal to the average eﬀect on the bond’s instantaneous expected
return over the bond’s life. The average eﬀect on the bond’s expected return is smaller than the
eﬀect on the current expected return for two reasons. Since the shock mean-reverts, its eﬀect on
the expected return of all bonds dies down over time. And even in the absence of mean reversion,
3Recent evidence suggests that supply eﬀects can have a signiﬁcant local component. For example, in September
2011 the Federal Reserve announced its intention to buy Treasury securities with maturities from six to 30 years and
sell an equal amount of securities with maturities up to three years. Upon announcement short-term yields increased,
contrary to our model. One way to generate more local eﬀects of supply is to assume that the demand and supply
for each maturity in the absence of arbitrageurs are price-elastic. See Vayanos and Vila (2009).
11the shock’s eﬀect on the expected return of any given bond decreases over time because the bond’s
time to maturity decreases and so does the bond’s sensitivity to changes in the price of short-rate
risk.
Proposition 3 (Expected Returns vs. Yields). A shock to the supply factor βt has a larger
eﬀect on instantaneous expected returns than on yields.
Supply can aﬀect prices only when arbitrageurs are risk averse. Indeed, when arbitrageurs
are risk neutral, they require no compensation for absorbing supply shocks, and these shocks do
not aﬀect prices. More generally, supply has stronger eﬀects when the arbitrageurs’ risk aversion
coeﬃcient a increases, i.e., not only when comparing risk-averse (a > 0) to risk-neutral (a = 0)
arbitrageurs, but also when comparing across any diﬀerent values of a.
Proposition 4 (Arbitrageur Risk Aversion). The eﬀect of the supply factor βt on instantaneous
expected returns is increasing in the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coeﬃcient a.
To turn Propositions 1-4 into testable hypotheses, we need to construct empirical measures of
supply. Changes in supply in our model are fully described by the single factor βt, and are hence
perfectly correlated across maturities. In practice, however, the correlation might be imperfect and
multiple factors might be needed to describe supply. Despite this limitation, our model provides
some guidance on suitable measures of supply. Indeed, supply aﬀects the equilibrium through the
prices of risk λr;t and λ;t. Substituting (12) into (11), we ﬁnd λi;t = aσ2
i ∆i;t for i = r,β, where
∆i;t ≡
∫ T
0
s
()
t Ai(τ)dτ. (17)
The price of risk for factor i = r,β is thus proportional to ∆i;t, the factor sensitivity of the
total supply available to arbitrageurs. The quantities ∆r;t and ∆;t characterize fully the eﬀects
of supply. Suppose, in particular, that supply is described by multiple factors, but one factor
suﬃces to describe the joint dynamics of ∆r;t and ∆;t. Then the equilibrium is the same as in
our model, in which supply is described by one factor. Using the calibration of our model based
on post-war U.S. data in Section 5, we can compute the functions Ar(τ) and A(τ), and evaluate
the correlation between ∆r;t and ∆;t in the data. This correlation is 98%, suggesting that our
one-factor description of supply is a good approximation.
The quantities ∆r;t and ∆;t are similar to dollar duration. Indeed, the dollar duration of the
supply available to arbitrageurs is ∆t ≡
∫ T
0 s
()
t τdτ, the sum of supply for each maturity τ, weighted
by τ. The quantities ∆r;t and ∆;t are similar weighted sums, with the weighting function τ being
12replaced by Ar(τ) and A(τ), respectively. In our empirical analysis, we use dollar duration ∆t as
the basis for our main measure of supply since it is similar in spirit to ∆r;t and ∆;t, and simpler to
construct. Using our calibration, we ﬁnd that ∆t has correlation 99% and 97%, respectively, with
∆r;t and ∆;t in the data. Hence, it approximates well both quantities.
The dollar duration ∆t concerns the supply s
()
t available to arbitrageurs, which we do not
observe. We proxy this supply by the supply of bonds issued by the government. This proxy
is accurate for our empirical purposes if shocks to the supply of government debt aﬀect the bond
portfolios held by arbitrageurs and other investors in a proportional manner. Propositions 1-3 yield
empirical hypotheses 1-3, respectively.
Hypothesis 1. A regression of bond yields on the dollar duration of government bond supply,
controlling for the short rate, has a positive coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient is either increasing or
hump-shaped across maturities.
Hypothesis 2. A regression of future bond returns on the dollar duration of government bond
supply, controlling for the short rate, has a positive coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient is increasing across
maturities.
Hypothesis 3. The regression coeﬃcient in Hypothesis 2 is larger than the one in Hypothesis 1.
The regression coeﬃcients in Hypotheses 1 and 2 correspond to the eﬀects of βt derived in
Propositions 1 and 2. These eﬀects are comparative statics, holding the short rate rt constant. To
identify these eﬀects in a regression, we control for the short rate. This control is not necessary
when the short rate is independent of supply, but becomes necessary when the two are correlated.
An additional empirical hypothesis follows from Proposition 4, which shows that the eﬀect of
supply on instantaneous expected returns is increasing in the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coeﬃcient
a. In our model a is constant over time, and Proposition 4 is a comparative statics result. Stepping
outside of the model, however, we can interpret Proposition 4 as concerning the eﬀects of time-
variation in a. If, in particular, a is decreasing in arbitrageur wealth, then it increases in periods
when arbitrageurs lose money. Identifying such periods requires a measure of arbitrageur returns.
We use a measure that is implied by our model and is simple to construct. Speciﬁcally, arbitrageurs
in our model hold large long positions in bonds when βt is high, and in that case their portfolio is
highly sensitive to changes in the short rate and the supply factor. Moreover, when either factor
increases, bond prices decrease, especially for long-term bonds. Thus, arbitrageurs lose money
when high values of βt are followed by under-performance of long- relative to short-term bonds. By
a similar argument, they also lose money when low values of βt are followed by over-performance
of long- relative to short-term bonds. We can identify high values of βt by high values of dollar
13duration of government bond supply. Using Proposition 1, we can also identify high βt by high
yields of intermediate- and long-term bonds relative to short-term bonds.
Hypothesis 4. The regression coeﬃcient in Hypothesis 2 is decreasing in arbitrageur wealth. Ar-
bitrageur wealth is low when:
• Periods when the term structure slopes up or the dollar duration of government bond supply
is high are followed by under-performance of long- relative to short-term bonds.
• Periods when the term structure slopes down or the dollar duration of government bond supply
is low are followed by over-performance of long- relative to short-term bonds.
Our analysis so far focuses on the case where the short rate rt and the supply factor βt are
independent. The independent case is derived by setting γ = σr = 0 in the speciﬁcation of the
short-rate process (6). We can also consider the correlated case, allowing γ and σr to be non-
zero. When σr ̸= 0, supply shocks aﬀect the current short rate. When γ ̸= 0, supply shocks
aﬀect expected future short rates holding the current short rate constant. In Section 5 we ﬁnd
that γ is positive in the data, meaning that an increase in supply lowers expected future short
rates. We derive an equilibrium with aﬃne yields in the correlated case in Appendix B.2. Within
this equilibrium, we can show that a positive γ reinforces the result of Proposition 3, shown in
the independent case, that supply has a smaller eﬀect on yields than on instantaneous expected
returns.
3 Data
3.1 Supply of Government Debt
Our main sample covers the period from June 1952 to December 2007. We also use a second sample
covering the period from June 1916 to June 1940, to evaluate the robustness of our ﬁndings. We
omit the period between the two samples because the U.S. Federal Reserve was pegging bond yields
across the term structure, so variation in yields was limited.4 We end our main sample in 2007
because we forecast three-year returns, which go until 2010.
To construct our main sample, we collect data from the CRSP historical bond database on every
U.S. government bond issued between 1940 and 2007. CRSP provides data on bond characteristics
(issue date, coupon rate, maturity, callability features) as well as monthly observations of face value
outstanding. As in Doepke and Schneider (2006), we break the stream of each bond’s cash ﬂows
4See, for example, Hetzel and Leach (2001) and D’Amico et al. (2012) for a description of the Fed’s policy during
that period.
14into principal and coupon payments. Consider, for example, the 7-year bond issued in February
1969 (CRSP ID 19760215.206250) with a coupon payment of 6.25%. On the last day of March
1972, investors holding the bond were expecting eight more coupon payments of $3.125 per $100 of
face value, starting in August 1972 and ending in February 1976 (the maturity of the bond), with
the full principal to be repaid in February 1976. CRSP reports a total face value of $882 million
outstanding as of March 1972. Thus, as of the last day of March 1972 there were eight coupon
payments of $27.56 million and the principal payment of $882 million.
Despite generally complete data from CRSP, there are some reporting gaps in face values. When
these occur, we ﬁll in with the face value outstanding at the end of the previous month. In early
years, face values are reported only occasionally. By the early 1950s, face values are reported
consistently. We further check the accuracy of the CRSP data by comparing aggregate face values
in selected months with releases of the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt.
For a large fraction of securities, CRSP reports both the entire face value and the face value
held by the public. The latter measure nets out Federal Reserve and interagency holdings, so it
seems a better proxy for the supply of bonds available to arbitrageurs. The face value held by
the public, however, is reported only sporadically for some bonds, and tends to be missing for bills
until the 1990s. We thus use the entire face value, although we explore corrections for Fed holdings,
which we report in our robustness tests in Section 4.3. Simple measures of the average maturity
of Fed holdings correlate strongly with the average maturity of all outstanding bonds. Moreover,
the size of the Fed’s portfolio is positively correlated with the debt-to-GDP ratio, and ﬂuctuated
between 4-7% of GDP during the 1952-2007 sample period. Taken together, these facts suggest
that variation in Fed holdings should generate only small variation in the supply of bonds held by
the public prior to 2007.
We construct the maturity structure of government debt at a given date by aggregating cash
ﬂows across individual bonds. Total payments due τ years from date t are
D
()
t = PR
()
t + C
()
t =
∑
i
PR
()
it +
∑
i
C
()
it ,
where PR
()
t are total principal payments, derived by summing over bonds the principal payment
PR
()
it that each bond i is due to make τ years from date t, and C
()
t are total coupon payments,
derived by summing over bonds the coupon payment C
()
it that each bond i is due to make τ years
from date t. Figure 1 shows the time-series average maturity structure of total payments scaled by
GDP. The ﬁgure marks principal and coupon payments separately.
15Following the theoretical discussion in Section 2, we construct our main measure of the supply
of government debt based on dollar duration. Our main measure is the maturity-weighted-debt-to-
GDP ratio
(
MWD
GDP
)
t
=
∑
0<≤30 D
()
t τ
GDPt
,
computed by multiplying the payments D
()
t for each maturity τ times τ, summing across matu-
rities, and scaling by GDP. Maturity-weighted debt is similar to dollar duration of debt, except
that we express the payments D
()
t in face value rather than market value terms. Following Kr-
ishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), we also measure supply by the long-term-debt-to-GDP
ratio. We compute this ratio
(
LTD
GDP
)
t
=
∑
10≤≤30 D
()
t
GDPt
,
by summing payments D
()
t across all maturities τ longer than ten years and scaling by GDP. This
measure is similar in spirit to our main measure, except that the weighting function is zero for
maturities below ten years and one for maturities above.
We express debt payments in face value rather than market value terms to avoid an endogeneity
problem: bond yields and returns, our dependent variables, have a mechanical eﬀect on supply, our
independent variable, if the latter is computed using market values. This eﬀect tends to generate a
spurious negative relationship between supply and yields or returns. For example, a decrease in the
demand for long-term bonds by investors would lower bond prices, and raise yields and expected
returns. It would also lower maturity-weighted debt and long-term debt if these are computed using
market values, thus generating a negative relationship. As we argue in Section 4.2, endogeneity
concerns are not entirely avoided when our measures are computed using face values. To address
these concerns, we perform instrumental-variables regressions. In Section 4.3 we also re-estimate
our regressions with market-value counterparts of our supply measures, and show that our main
results are robust.5
5Our results are also robust to scaling by household net worth from Table B100 of the Flow of Funds instead of
by GDP. Either scaling can be viewed a simple way to adjust for time-series variation in the risk-bearing capacity of
arbitrageurs. Finally, our results would not be aﬀected by taking bond callability into account. This is because there
are few callable bonds and most of them are callable close to their maturity date.
16A useful decomposition of maturity-weighted debt to GDP is
(
MWD
GDP
)
t
= Mt ·
∑
0<≤30 D
()
t
GDPt
, (18)
where
Mt =
∑
0<≤30 D
()
t τ
∑
0<≤30 D
()
t
.
The variable Mt is dollar-weighted average maturity, constructed by weighting each maturity τ
by the fraction that the corresponding payments D
()
t represent of total payments. The variable
∑
0<≤30 D
()
t /GDPt is total debt payments divided by GDP. It diﬀers from the standard debt-to-
GDP ratio (such as described in Bohn 2008) because it includes coupon payments but does not
include non-marketable debt such as intra-governmental obligations. Despite these diﬀerences, it
is highly correlated with debt to GDP: the correlation is 92% in the 1952-2007 sample. Eq. (18)
thus implies that maturity-weighted debt to GDP can be thought of intuitively as the product of
average maturity times debt to GDP.
While variation in maturity-weighted debt to GDP can be decomposed into two distinct com-
ponents, variation in average maturity and in debt to GDP, these two components are strongly
positively correlated: the correlation between dollar-weighted average maturity and debt to GDP
is 60% in the 1952-2007 sample. The positive correlation reﬂects the fact that as the US govern-
ment increased the size of its debt, it issued a larger fraction of it long-term to reduce the risk
of having to reﬁnance large amounts of short-term debt at high rates (Greenwood, Hanson and
Stein 2010). The strong correlation makes it somewhat diﬃcult to discern whether the eﬀects of
debt supply are driven by maturity-weighted debt to GDP, or by average maturity, or by debt
to GDP. Nevertheless, in our main return-forecasting regressions maturity-weighted debt to GDP
drives out either of the other two variables in horse races, as we show in Table C.4 in Appendix C.
Thus, average maturity brings useful additional information relative to debt to GDP in forecasting
returns, and conversely debt to GDP brings useful information relative to average maturity.
Figure 2 plots dollar-weighted average maturity, debt to GDP, and our two measures of debt
supply for the 1952-2007 sample. Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for these variables.
Figure 2 shows that maturity-weighted debt to GDP varies signiﬁcantly over time. For example,
it decreased sharply from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, to a minimum value of 79.9%, and
increased sharply from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, to a maximum value of 463%. These
17movements were driven by variation in both average maturity and debt to GDP.
The sharp drop in average maturity from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, and the subsequent
rise, were partly driven by the 4.5% regulatory ceiling on bonds’ coupon rates. Because of the
ceiling, the Treasury did not issue bonds between 1965-1973, leading to a decline in average ma-
turity. Maturity started increasing in 1976, when Congress raised the maturity of notes, to which
the ceiling did not apply, to ten years. The ceiling was eliminated in 1988. An additional driver
of the rise in average maturity during the 1980s was the expansion of government debt. Indeed,
the Treasury issued at long maturities to reduce the risk of having to reﬁnance large amounts of
short-term debt at high interest rates.6 The sharp increase in debt during the 1980s and early
1990s was driven by a combination of tax cuts and increased military spending.
To construct our second sample, we collect data from Banking and Monetary Statistics (BMS).
BMS reports the maturity structure of government debt in six- and twelve-month intervals begin-
ning in June 1916. Using these data, we construct maturity-weighted debt to GDP. We use the
same deﬁnition as for the 1952-2007 sample, but because the data are coarser we construct our
measure slightly diﬀerently. BMS groups bonds into maturity buckets and reports total face value
within a bucket. We assign the average maturity of each bucket to all bonds in that bucket, e.g.,
all bonds in the ﬁve- to ten- year bucket are assigned maturity 7.5 years. Moreover, we do not take
into account coupon payments since they are not reported in the BMS data.
Figure 3 plots dollar-weighted average maturity, debt to GDP, and our two measures of debt
supply as a function of time for the 1916-1940 sample. Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics
of the same variables. Figure 3 shows that maturity-weighted debt to GDP varies signiﬁcantly over
time. Its movements parallel those of debt to GDP, as average maturity is approximately ﬂat in
most of the sample. Debt to GDP was nearly zero in 1916, then rose sharply during World War I,
and then declined during the 1920s. It rose sharply again during the early 1930s, as GDP decreased
during the Great Depression and spending on social programs increased.
3.2 Bond Yields and Returns
We use the Fama-Bliss discount bond database to obtain yields and holding-period returns for one-,
two-, three-, four- and ﬁve-year zero-coupon bonds for the 1952-2007 sample period. Beyond ﬁve
years, yields are not available for most maturities. However, Ibbotson Associates provides yields
and returns for a bond with an approximate maturity of twenty years, and we use this to obtain a
long-term yield and return. For the 1971-2007 period, we use the zero-coupon curves provided by
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007) to obtain yields and returns for bonds with maturities of up
6A detailed discussion of the variation in the maturity of government debt from 1952 onwards is in Garbade (2007).
18to ﬁfteen years. For the 1916-1940 period, we use Global Financial Data to obtain the yield and
return of a bond with an approximate maturity of ten years. We do not have one-year zero-coupon
yields (the Fama-Bliss database starts in 1952), and use instead monthly Treasury-bill yields rolled
over one year as our measure of the one-year yield.
Yields and returns are computed in logs. We denote by y
()
t the yield of the τ-year bond at
date t. (This is consistent with the notation in our model for the one- to ﬁve-year bonds because
they are zero-coupon, and for simplicity we also use this notation for the long-term coupon bond.)
We denote by r
()
t+1 the return of the τ-year bond during the year following date t, and by
r
()
t+k;k ≡
k ∑
k′=1
r
(−k′+1)
t+k′
the bond’s cumulative return during the k years following date t.
4 Results
4.1 Basic Tests
Table 2 shows regressions of yields and future returns on our two measures of government debt
supply: maturity-weighted debt to GDP, and long-term debt to GDP. The yield regression is
y
()
t = a + bXt + cy
(1)
t + ut, (19)
where y
()
t is the yield on the τ-year bond, Xt is the measure of supply, and y
(1)
t is the one-year yield
which we use as a control for the short rate. Observations are monthly. We include the short-rate
control in all our regressions for yields and returns because the short rate in the data is negatively
correlated with supply. In Table C.1 in Appendix C we show that omitting this control and using
as dependent variables yield spreads instead of yields and excess returns instead of returns does
not aﬀect our results.
The results of the yield regression are in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows of Table 2. Because yields can depend
on persistent variables other than supply and the short rate (e.g., expected future short rates), the
regression residuals are serially correlated and t-statistics must be adjusted accordingly. We report
a ﬁrst set of t-statistics using Newey and West (1987) standard errors and allowing for 36 months
of lags. Allowing for more lags does not seem to aﬀect the results. We also report a second set
19of t-statistics computed by estimating an AR(1) process for the regression residuals. These are
lower than in Table 2 but the positive relationship between supply and yields remains statistically
signiﬁcant (at the one-sided 5% level) in most speciﬁcations. Our ﬁndings thus support Hypothesis
1.
To evaluate the economic signiﬁcance of the yield results, we note, for example, that when supply
is measured by maturity-weighted debt to GDP, it carries a coeﬃcient of 0.004 in the regression of
the long-term yield. Thus, an increase in supply by one standard deviation (0.997 from Table 1),
holding the one-year yield constant, is associated with an increase of 40 basis points (bps) in the
long-term yield. This is about one-half of the long-term yield’s standard deviation conditional on
the one-year yield. Measuring supply by long-term debt to GDP yields similar results.
Our time-series estimates of the link between supply and yields are somewhat smaller than
estimates of the price impact of recent Quantitative Easing (QE) programs undertaken in the U.K.
and the U.S. During a ﬁrst QE program in 2009-2010, the U.S. Federal Reserve bought $300 billion
of Treasury securities and about $1 trillion of other securities such as agency and mortgage-backed.
It bought an additional $600 billion of Treasury securities during a second QE program in 2010-
2011. The average maturity of Treasury securities purchased by the Fed was approximately 6.5
years (Figure 1 of D’Amico and King 2013). Taking the corresponding duration to be ﬁve years
and GDP to be $14 trillion, the reduction in maturity-weight debt to GDP was 0.9×5/14 = 0.32 if
only Treasury securities are included, and 1.9×5/14 = 0.68 if the other securities are also included.
Gagnon et al. (2011), D’Amico et al. (2012), and Li and Wei (2012) estimate that the two QE
programs together lowered the 10-year Treasury yield by 90-100 basis points.
Between 2009 and mid-2010, the Bank of England bought $200 of Treasury securities. The
average maturity of the purchased bonds was approximately 14.5 years (Chart 4 of Joyce et al.
2011). Taking the corresponding duration to be ten years and GDP to be $1.5 trillion, the reduction
in maturity-weight debt to GDP was 0.2×10/1.5 = 1.33. Joyce et al. (2011) estimate that the QE
program lowered the 10-year Treasury yield by about 100bps.
Our estimate that a unit decrease in maturity-weighted debt to GDP lowers the long-term yield
by 40bps is somewhat smaller than the QE estimates. This could be because of the higher risk
aversion during the QE period and the ﬁnancial crisis. Moreover, part of the QE eﬀect was due to a
decrease in expected future short rates (about one-third in the U.S. according to Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen 2012), while in our time-series analysis decreases in bond supply are associated
with increases in expected future short rates.
We next turn to the results on returns. Panel A of Figure 4 plots maturity-weighted debt to
GDP (horizontal axis) against the subsequent three-year excess return of the long-term bond. The
20series are sampled annually, in December. The ﬁgure shows a positive correlation. We complement
the ﬁgure with the return regression
r
()
t+k;k = a + bXt + cy
(1)
t + ut+k, (20)
where r
()
t+k;k is the future k-year return of the τ-year bond, Xt is supply, and y
(1)
t is the one-year
yield. Observations are monthly. We perform this regression for one-year returns for all bonds in
our sample, and for three- and ﬁve-year returns for the long-term bond.
The results of the return regression are in the last seven rows of Table 2. As in the case of yields,
t-statistics must be adjusted for serial correlation in the regression residuals. In the case of returns,
serial correlation arises from two sources. First, persistent variables other than supply and the
short rate can aﬀect expected returns (e.g., macroeconomic variables, investor demand). Second,
because returns are measured over one or more years but are sampled monthly, measurement
periods overlap. Sampling returns annually eliminates the overlap problem in the case of one-year
returns. Results for annual sampling, shown in Table 5, are similar to those in Table 2.
We report a ﬁrst set of t-statistics in Table 2 using Newey and West (1987) standard errors
and allowing for min{36,1.5k} months of lags, where k is the forecast horizon in years (thus,
36 months for one-year returns, 54 months for three-year returns, and 90 months for ﬁve-year
returns). Allowing for more lags does not seem to aﬀect the results. We also report a second set of
t-statistics obtained by estimating a parametric process for the regression residuals. As Cochrane
(2008) points out, a plausible process in the case of one-year returns and annual sampling is
ARMA(1,1): such a process would arise if we assume that the annual residuals are the sum of a
white-noise component and an expected-return component that is AR(1). Under monthly sampling,
the same assumptions on the monthly residuals generate instead an ARMA(1,12k) process for k-
year returns. The t-statistics based on the ARMA(1,12k) process tend to be slightly lower but
the positive relationship between supply and future returns remains statistically signiﬁcant in most
speciﬁcations. For example, for three-year returns the t-statistic is 4.200 under Newey and West,
and 4.203 under ARMA(1,36); for ﬁve-year returns it is 5.381 under Newey and West, and 3.824
under ARMA(1,60). Our ﬁndings thus support Hypothesis 2.
As an additional robustness check for our yield and return regressions, we use the bootstrap
approach suggested by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) and Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (2001). We
compute bootstrapped p-values by comparing the Newey and West t-statistic to the distribution
of bootstrapped t-statistics. To preserve the time-series dependence of the original data, we create
pseudo time series using the stationary block bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994). We repeat
21this exercise, varying the block size between 12 months and 24 years (288 months). When supply
is measured by maturity-weighted debt to GDP, p-values range between 3.8-7.2% for the yield of
the long-term bond and 0.6-2.3% for that bond’s one-year return (Table C.3 in Appendix C).7
To evaluate the economic signiﬁcance of the return results, we note, for example, that when
supply is measured by maturity-weighted debt to GDP, it carries a coeﬃcient of 0.026 in the
regression of the one-year return of the long-term bond. Thus, an increase in supply by one
standard deviation, holding the one-year yield constant, is associated with an increase of 259bps
in the expected one-year return of the long-term bond. This is about one-third of that return’s
standard deviation conditional on the one-year yield. Measuring supply by long-term debt to GDP
yields similar results.
The eﬀects of supply on yields are smaller than on expected returns: the coeﬃcients in the
yield regression in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows of Table 2 are smaller than their counterparts in the return
regression in the next ﬁve rows of the table. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3. As we point out
in Section 2, a smaller eﬀect of supply on yields than on returns is to be expected for two reasons.
First, supply shocks in the data are negatively correlated with changes in future short rates, and
this dampens the eﬀect that they have on yields through expected returns. Second, even in the
absence of correlation, the eﬀect of a supply shock on a bond’s expected return dies down over time
both because (i) the shock mean-reverts, and (ii) the bond’s time to maturity decreases and so does
the bond’s sensitivity to changes in the price of short-rate risk. The shock’s mean-reversion can
be caused by mean-reversion in the supply of bonds by the government, or by entry of new capital
in the market to absorb the shock. Since the shock’s eﬀect on a bond’s expected return dies out
over time, the shock’s eﬀect on the bond’s yield, which is the average eﬀect on the bond’s expected
return over the bond’s life, is smaller than the eﬀect on the bond’s current expected return.
According to Hypothesis 2, the coeﬃcient of supply in the return regression should be increasing
with maturity because longer-maturity bonds are more sensitive to changes in the price of short-rate
risk. Moreover, according to Hypothesis 1, the coeﬃcient of supply in the yield regression should
be increasing or hump-shaped. Table 2 shows an increasing pattern for the ﬁve maturities that
are available in our 1952-2007 sample. To examine whether this pattern holds for a larger set of
maturities, we focus on the sub-sample 1971-2007 for which Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007)
provide zero-coupon yields for all maturities between one and ﬁfteen years. Table 3 reports the
coeﬃcients from our yield and return regressions in the sub-sample, in the case of one-year returns
and maturity-weighted debt to GDP. Figure 5 plots these coeﬃcients as a function of maturity. The
7An additional concern related to statistical signiﬁcance is that the coeﬃcient of the return regression may be
biased if innovations in the forecasting variable, i.e., supply, are correlated with innovations in returns (Mankiw
and Shapiro (1986), Stambaugh (1986)). This bias is small in our data and works against us because it lowers the
regression coeﬃcient.
22table and the ﬁgure conﬁrm the increasing pattern, while also showing that the eﬀects of supply
remain signiﬁcant in the sub-sample.
4.2 Instrumental Variables Tests
One concern with our analysis is that our measures of supply could be endogenous and aﬀected by
variables which also aﬀect bond yields and returns. As we point out in Section 3, one endogeneity
problem arises when supply is measured in market value terms since it is then aﬀected mechanically
by bond yields and returns. But endogeneity could arise even when supply is measured in face
value terms. Suppose, for example, that the government chooses maturity structure to minimize
the expected interest payments on its debt. Then, an increase in the demand for long-term bonds
by investors would lower their yields and induce the government to shift the issuance of its debt
towards long maturities.8 The average maturity of government debt would then increase, and so
would maturity-weighted debt to GDP which is (approximately) the product of average maturity
times debt to GDP. This would generate a negative relationship between supply and yields or
returns, and would bias our analysis towards ﬁnding smaller eﬀects.
To address the possible endogeneity of the maturity structure of government debt, we follow the
instrumental variables (IV) approach of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (KVJ 2012). KVJ
use debt to GDP, as well as its square and cube, as instruments for maturity structure. Debt to
GDP is a suitable instrument because it is driven mostly by the cumulation of past deﬁcits rather
than by changes in investor demand. It causes variation in maturity-weighted debt to GDP through
two channels. The ﬁrst is mechanical: holding average maturity constant, maturity-weighted debt
to GDP varies because it is (approximately) the product of average maturity times debt to GDP.
Second, and as pointed out in Section 3, an increase in debt to GDP induces governments to issue
a larger fraction of their debt long term, hence raising average maturity.
Table 4 shows IV regressions for the yield and for the one- and three-year return of the long-term
bond. We measure supply by maturity-weighted debt to GDP, and use the ratio of marketable
Treasury debt to GDP as our instrument. Marketable debt includes the bonds in the CRSP
database as well as Inﬂation Protected Securities (TIPS), and is measured in face value terms.
Adding the square and cube of marketable debt to GDP as instruments, as in KVJ, does not aﬀect
our results. Our results are also not aﬀected if we use only the bonds in CRSP instead of all
8Guibaud, Nosbusch and Vayanos (2013) study issuance policy in the presence of investor clienteles and demand
shocks. They show that a welfare-maximizing government tailors the maturity structure of its debt to the clientele
mix, e.g., issues a larger fraction of its debt long-term when the fraction of long-horizon investors increases. A supply
response to demand shocks could also be generated by the private sector. Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2009) show that households are more likely to take ﬁxed-rate mortgages (eﬀectively issuing long-term bonds) when
long-term bonds are expensive relative to short-term bonds. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) show that private
ﬁrms issue a larger fraction of their debt long-term when the supply of long-term bonds by the government is low.
23marketable Treasury debt. If we use total debt (Bohn 2008), which includes also non-marketable
debt, then our results weaken somewhat. The results for the latter two instruments are shown in
Tables C.5 and C.6 in Appendix C.
The top panel of Table 4 shows the ﬁrst-stage regression of maturity-weighted debt to GDP
on marketable debt to GDP, controlling for the short rate. The R-squared is 83.5%, conﬁrming
that much of the variation in maturity-weighted debt to GDP is driven by debt to GDP. The
bottom panel shows the IV regressions. The t-statistics are computed using Newey and West
(1987) standard errors and allowing for 36 months of lags for the yield and the one-year return, and
54 months for the three-year return. The eﬀect of supply on the yield is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The eﬀect on the one- and three-year return is, however, and the coeﬃcients are almost identical to
their OLS counterparts in Table 2 (0.028 for IV and 0.026 for OLS in the case of one-year return;
0.067 for IV and 0.065 for OLS in the case of three-year return).
4.3 Robustness Tests
In addition to the IV tests shown in Table 4, we perform a number of other robustness tests. Some
of the tests concern our main sample and others our second sample 1916-1940. Table 5 reports tests
on our main sample for the one- and three-year return of the long-term bond. We ﬁrst compute our
measures of supply in market value rather than face value terms. The market-value counterpart of
maturity-weighted debt to GDP is
(
MWD
GDP
)
MV;t
=
∑
0<≤30 e−y
()
t D
()
t τ
GDPt
,
where y
()
t is the yield of a zero-coupon bond with maturity τ at date t. Because there is not enough
information to compute an accurate term structure of zero-coupon yields for the entire 1952-2007
sample period, we use the approximation
(
MWD
GDP
)
MV;t
≈
∑
i MVi;tDuri;t
GDPt
, (21)
where the summation is over all bonds in the CRSP database, MVi;t is the market value of bond i
at date t, and Duri;t is the bond’s Macaulay duration. We can compute Macaulay duration because
CRSP reports yield to maturity for each bond. The approximation (21) is exact when the term
structure is ﬂat. We compute a market-value counterpart of long-term debt to GDP by adding the
market value of all bonds whose remaining maturity exceeds ten years and scaling by GDP.
24Rows (2)-(5) of Table 5 show OLS and IV regressions for our market-value-based measures
of supply. For the IV regressions we use the same instrument and methodology as in Table 4.
The coeﬃcients of our supply measures are larger in the IV regression than in the OLS regression,
especially for one-year returns (0.007 for IV and 0.003 for OLS in the case of maturity-weighted debt
to GDP; 1.395 for IV and 0.894 for OLS in the case of long-term debt to GDP). This is consistent
with the endogeneity problem mentioned in Section 3: measuring supply in market value terms
tends to induce a mechanical negative relationship between supply and yields or returns, biasing
the OLS estimates downwards. The IV coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, with t-statistics
similar to those derived when measuring supply in face value terms (Table 4). The OLS coeﬃcients
have smaller t-statistics than their face-value counterparts (Table 2), but they remain statistically
signiﬁcant except in one case.
We next add to our regressions a number of macroeconomic controls. Macroeconomic variables,
such as output growth and inﬂation, have been shown to forecast bond returns (e.g., Ferson and
Harvey (1991), Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003), and Ludvigson and Ng (2009)). If the same
variables aﬀect maturity structure and debt to GDP, then our supply measures could forecast bond
returns regardless of any causal eﬀect of supply.
Rows (6)-(12) report the results of including macroeconomic controls. Supply in these rows and
the rest of Table 5 is measured by maturity-weighted debt to GDP computed in face value terms.
Our ﬁrst control is the term spread, deﬁned as the yield spread between the long-term and the
one-year bond. According to our model and the evidence in Table 2, the term spread is aﬀected by
supply and can hence subsume some of the supply eﬀect. Yet, Table 5 shows that supply remains
signiﬁcant when controlling for the term spread. Our remaining controls are output gap, output
growth, inﬂation, inﬂation risk, volatility in short-term interest rates, and stock market volatility.
(Details of how each of these controls is computed are in Table 1.) Table 5 shows that the positive
relationship between supply and future returns remains signiﬁcant when including any of these
controls. This is not entirely surprising: macroeconomic risk premia mainly vary at business-cycle
frequency, but supply captures a lower-frequency component of expected returns.
Rows (13)-(17) show that our results remain signiﬁcant after the following controls and adjust-
ments. Row (13) controls for a time trend. Row (14) controls for future changes in debt supply by
adding the variable (MWD/GDP)t+k − (MWD/GDP)t to the regression. Since debt supply af-
fects yields, as implied by our model and the evidence in Table 2, changes in supply can explain part
of returns. Controlling for them reduces estimation noise, and indeed our results strengthen some-
what. Row (15) nets out Federal Reserve holdings to derive a better proxy for the supply of bonds
available to arbitrageurs. We compute Fed holdings using data from Banking and Monetary Statis-
tics between 1952-1970 and from issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin after 1970. These sources
25report holdings by maturity buckets rather than for individual bonds. We construct a measure of
maturity-weighted debt held by the Fed by assigning the average maturity of each bucket to all
bonds in that bucket. We then subtract that measure from our main measure of maturity-weighted
debt. Rows (16) and (17) sample the data annually in September and December respectively. For
these annual regressions, the Newey-West standard errors are based on three years of lags in the
case of one-year returns, and ﬁve years of lags in the case of three-year returns.
An important robustness test is whether our results hold in another time period. We consider
the period 1916-1940, and omit the period between 1941 and the beginning of our main sample in
1952 for reasons explained in Section 3. Panel B of Figure 4 plots our main result for the 1916-
1940 sample. Maturity-weighted debt to GDP (horizontal axis) is positively correlated with the
subsequent three-year excess return of the long-term bond. Table 6 shows our yield and return
regressions for the long-term bond. Yields are positively correlated with supply, but the correlation
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Future returns are also positively correlated with supply. This
correlation is not statistically signiﬁcant for one-year returns but becomes highly signiﬁcant for
three-year returns. The latter correlation remains signiﬁcant even after excluding the years 1916
and 1917 which appear in Figure 4 to play a large role in driving the correlation.
4.4 Arbitrageur Wealth and Bond Returns
When arbitrageurs become more risk averse, they demand higher compensation to accommodate
changes in bond supply, and bond supply has a stronger eﬀect on expected returns. In this section
we explore time-series implications of this idea under the assumption that risk aversion increases
following losses. Based on Hypothesis 4, we construct two measures of the change in arbitrageur
wealth during the year that precedes date t:
∆WArb
1t = (y
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t−1 − y
(1)
t−1) · rx
()
t , (22)
∆WArb
2t =
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where rx
()
t ≡ r
()
t − y
(1)
t−1 denotes the excess return of the bond with maturity τ during that year.
The ﬁrst measure is the product of the yield spread between maturities τ and one at date t−1 times
excess bond returns during the following year. This measure identiﬁes arbitrageurs’ past positions
based on the slope of the term structure. The second measure is the product of maturity-weighted
debt to GDP at date t − 1 times excess bond returns during the following year. This measure
26identiﬁes arbitrageurs’ past positions based on the supply of government debt.9 We assume that
the yield spread and excess returns in the deﬁnition of the measures concern the long-term bond.
We examine whether our measures of arbitrageur wealth inﬂuence the relationship between
supply and future returns, documented in Section 4.1, and between the slope of the term structure
and future returns. The latter relationship has been documented by Fama and Bliss (1987), and
arises naturally in our model. Indeed, in periods when supply is high, expected bond returns are
high (Proposition 2), and the term structure slopes up in the sense that intermediate- and long-
term bonds have high yields relative to short-term bonds (Proposition 1). As with supply, slope
has predictive power only when arbitrageurs are risk averse, so we would expect more predictive
power the higher risk aversion is.
Table 7 reports results from regressing the return of the long-term bond, over both a one- and
a three-year horizon, on (i) maturity-weighted debt to GDP and its interaction with either of our
two measures of arbitrageur wealth, or on (ii) the long-term yield spread and its interaction with
either of our two measures. In all cases we control for the short rate, so the regression equation is
r
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According to Hypothesis 4, the interaction terms should have a negative coeﬃcient: supply and
slope predict returns positively, and more so when arbitrageur wealth decreases. The results conﬁrm
this prediction in the case of one-year returns. Indeed, the interaction terms between supply and
our two measures of arbitrageur wealth have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, and
the same is true for the interaction terms between slope and arbitrageur wealth. In the case of
three-year returns, the interaction terms have a negative coeﬃcient, but only one out of the four
is statistically signiﬁcant. Controlling for past returns does not aﬀect the statistical signiﬁcance of
the interaction terms.
The coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are economically signiﬁcant. Consider, for example,
the interaction term between supply and our ﬁrst measure of arbitrageur wealth, (22). This term
has a coeﬃcient of -4.436 for one-year returns. From Table 1, the standard deviation of the wealth
measure is 0.0015. Therefore, a one-standard deviation movement in the wealth measure changes
9An alternative version of measure (23), which is more in the spirit of Hypothesis 4, is
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)
denotes the time-series average of maturity-weighted debt to GDP. Under both (24) and Hypothesis
4, arbitrageurs are short bonds when the dollar duration of government bond supply is low. Under (23) instead,
arbitrageurs hold a small long position. The choice of (23) or (24) does not matter for our results.
27the coeﬃcient of maturity-weighted debt to GDP by 4.436×0.0015=0.0067. This is approximately
a one-quarter percentage change since the coeﬃcient is 0.026 (Tables 2 and 7).
Table 7 assumes that arbitrageur risk aversion is inﬂuenced by trading performance over a one-
year horizon. The relevant horizon might be diﬀerent, however, and is inﬂuenced by the speed at
which fresh capital can enter in the arbitrage industry. If entry is fast, then capital losses over the
distant past do not aﬀect current capital or risk aversion because the lost capital is replenished
quickly. Our analysis provides an estimate of the speed of entry, which might be relevant for theories
of slow-moving capital.10 In Table C.7 in Appendix C we measure the change in arbitrageur wealth
by
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i.e., the sum of wealth changes over the past k years, where the change in wealth over any given
year is measured as in the baseline case (Eqs. (22) and (23)). The interaction term is economically
and statistically signiﬁcant at horizons of one and two years. These ﬁndings suggest that capital
losses in term-structure arbitrage take two to three years to be oﬀset by inﬂows of fresh capital.
5 Calibration
In this section we calibrate our model to the data. We estimate parameters for the supply-factor
process (5) and the short-rate process (6). We also estimate the sensitivity of supply at each
maturity to changes in the supply factor. These parameters, together with the arbitrageur risk-
aversion coeﬃcient a, fully determine the eﬀects of supply on yields and expected returns within
the model. Since these eﬀects are an increasing function of a, there exists a unique value of a that
equates the average eﬀect of supply on yields and expected returns in the model and in the data.
We compute this value and compare it to estimates of risk aversion used in the literature. We also
examine whether the value of a that matches the average eﬀect of supply can also match relative
eﬀects, e.g., on yields relative to expected returns and on long- relative to short-term bonds.
To estimate parameters (κ,κr,γ,σ,σr,σr) for the supply-factor process (5) and the short-
10See, for example, Duﬃe’s (2010) presidential address to the American Finance Association for a model of slow-
moving capital and a survey of the theoretical and empirical work in that area. See also Gromb and Vayanos (2010)
for a survey of the theoretical literature on the limits of arbitrage.
28rate process (6), we discretize these processes and perform a vector auto-regression (VAR) on
monthly data in the 1952-2007 sample. We use maturity-weighted debt to GDP as our proxy for
the supply factor βt, and the one-year yield y
(1)
t as our proxy for the short rate rt.11 The details of
the vector auto-regressions and of the remaining steps in our calibration are in Appendix B.3. Our
estimate of the mean-reversion parameter κr for the short rate is larger than its counterpart κ
for the supply factor: the short rate mean-reverts at business-cycle frequency, while movements in
maturity-weighted debt to GDP occur at a lower frequency as shown in Figure 2. Our estimate of
γ is positive, meaning that a shock to the supply factor moves expected future short rates, holding
the current short rate constant, and this movement is in the direction opposite to the shock. Our
estimate of σr is positive, meaning that shocks to the supply factor and to the short rate are
positively correlated. The correlation is small, however.
To estimate the sensitivity of supply at any given maturity τ to changes in the supply factor,
we regress supply at that maturity scaled by GDP on maturity-weighted debt to GDP. This yields
an estimate for the function θ(τ), which we plot in Figure C.2 in Appendix C. The function θ(τ)
is positive, meaning that an increase in the supply factor raises supply at each maturity.
Given our estimates for (κ,κr,γ,σ,σr,σr,θ(τ)) and a value for the arbitrageur risk-aversion
coeﬃcient a, we compute an equilibrium in our model using Theorem B.2 in Appendix B.2. We
then compute the average coeﬃcient of supply across the 28 yield and return regressions reported
in Table 3, which concern zero-coupon bonds with maturities from two to ﬁfteen years. The value
of a that renders this average coeﬃcient in the model equal to that in the data is a = 57. Using
a diﬀerent set of regressions has a small eﬀect on a: for example, using only the fourteen yield
regressions we ﬁnd a = 42, and using only the fourteen return regressions we ﬁnd a = 64.
We can compute a standard error for our estimates of a using Monte-Carlo simulation. We
generate artiﬁcial samples by simulating the VAR equations with the parameters computed from
our actual sample and reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B.3. For each artiﬁcial sample, we re-
estimate the VAR, and compute a new value for a using the procedure described in this section.
With 10000 samples, the standard error for the estimate a = 57 is 13.7 and the [5%, 95%] conﬁdence
interval is [37.1, 82.6].
The coeﬃcient a measures the absolute risk aversion of arbitrageurs. To convert a into a
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), we must multiply it by arbitrageur wealth. This
11An alternative proxy for t could be constructed based on the total supply of debt, i.e., including corporate and
mortgage-backed debt in addition to government debt. This proxy captures the idea that arbitrageurs care about the
total duration risk that they bear, whether it comes from government or non-government debt. If shocks to the supply
of government and non-government debt are positively correlated, then our estimate of arbitrageur risk aversion a
under the alternative proxy will be lower than under our original proxy. Indeed, since positive correlation implies
larger shocks to total duration risk, explaining a given eﬀect of supply requires lower arbitrageur risk aversion. The
opposite will be true if the two sets of shocks are negatively correlated. Constructing the alternative proxy requires
time-series data on the maturity composition of non-government debt, which are not available for much of our sample.
29wealth must be expressed as a fraction of GDP since debt supply is expressed in the same manner.
A natural interpretation of arbitrageurs in our model is as hedge funds and proprietary-trading
desks: these agents typically have short horizons as our arbitrageurs. Hedge Fund Research reports
that the capital controlled by hedge funds in 2007 was 13.3% of GDP. Assuming that this is
representative of the level of arbitrage capital in our 1952-2007 sample, we estimate the CRRA to
be 57 × 13.3% = 7.6.
Our estimate of CRRA assumes that arbitrageurs are the only agents to absorb shocks to the
supply of government debt. This is because we proxy the supply available to arbitrageurs, which
we do not observe, by the supply of bonds issued by the government. Arbitrageurs, however, are
likely to be absorbing only a fraction of supply shocks, with the rest being absorbed by investors
such as pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds. Such investors have typically longer
horizons than arbitrageurs. Our model treats their demand as exogenous and part of the net supply
available to arbitrageurs. As a crude way to adjust for the presence of these investors, we add the
capital that they control to arbitrage capital. According to the Flow of Funds tables, the capital
controlled by private pension funds in 2007 was 45.7% of GDP, that by insurance companies (life and
property casualty) was 45.2%, and that by mutual funds was 55.8%. Adding these to hedge-fund
capital, we estimate the CRRA to be 57 × (13.3% + 45.7% + 45.2% + 55.8%) = 91.2.
Our second estimate of the CRRA assumes that investors can respond to supply shocks in the
same manner as arbitrageurs. If, however, their response is slow or limited by constraints related
to market segmentation (e.g., pension funds must keep a stable bond-stock mix), then the estimate
would be smaller. The estimate would also be smaller if we include additional risk factors in the
model, e.g., allow for variation in investor demand. Yet, our ﬁnding that supply eﬀects in the
bond market can be consistent with CRRA values that are large relative to typical values used
in the literature is worthy of further investigation. This is especially so since estimates of supply
eﬀects from recent quantitative easing programs are somewhat larger than ours (Section 4.1), hence
implying even larger values of risk aversion.
We next examine whether the risk-aversion coeﬃcient that matches the average eﬀect of supply
in the model and in the data can also match relative eﬀects. Figure 6 plots the coeﬃcients of
supply in the 28 yield and return regressions in Table 3 as a function of maturity, and compares
with the coeﬃcients derived from the model for a = 57. The spread between the returns and yields
coeﬃcients is smaller in the model than in the data. These discrepancies are, however, mostly
within conﬁdence intervals. Both sets of coeﬃcients are increasing with maturity in the model as
in the data. The eﬀect of maturity is larger in the model than in the data for the yields coeﬃcients
and smaller for the returns coeﬃcients.
306 Conclusion
The supply and maturity structure of government debt play no role in standard term-structure
theories. Yet, their eﬀects on bond yields and expected returns are the subject of numerous policy
debates, ranging from debt management by treasury departments to quantitative easing by central
banks. Given the importance of these debates, it is surprising how little empirical evidence there
is correlating supply and maturity structure to bond yields and returns in long time-series. This
paper is an attempt to ﬁll that gap.
We organize our empirical investigation around a term-structure model in which risk-averse
arbitrageurs absorb shocks to the demand and supply for bonds of diﬀerent maturities. The model
predicts that an increase in supply should raise bond yields and expected returns, holding the short
rate constant, and these eﬀects should be stronger for longer-maturity bonds and during times when
arbitrageurs are more risk averse. The model also suggests that the empirically relevant measure
of supply is maturity-weighted debt, which captures the duration risk that arbitrageurs must bear.
Using U.S. data, we ﬁnd support for the model’s predictions. In particular, an increase in our
supply measure by one standard deviation, holding the one-year rate constant, raises the yield on a
long-term government bond with approximate maturity twenty years by 40 basis points (bps) and
its expected return over a one-year horizon by 259bps. We use our empirical estimates of supply
eﬀects to calibrate the model and infer arbitrageur risk aversion.
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Figure 1 
Principal and coupon payments 
 
The time-series average, for each maturity year, of total payments on bills, bonds, and notes scaled by GDP. 
The bottom bars denote principal payments. The darker top bars denote coupon payments. Any payments 
beyond 30 years are included in the 30-year bucket. The data are based on the CRSP bond database and cover 
the period June 1952-December 2007.  
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Bond supply, 1952-2007 
 
MWD/GDP is the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio, computed by multiplying each debt payment 
by the corresponding maturity, summing across maturities, and scaling by GDP. LTD/GDP is the long-
term-debt-to-GDP ratio, computed by summing all debt payments with maturity beyond ten years, and 
scaling by GDP. M is the dollar-weighted average maturity expressed in years. D/GDP is the ratio of the 
aggregate principal payments of all Treasury securities to GDP. MWD/GDP, LTD/GDP, and M are 
computed using aggregate principal and coupon payments.  
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Bond supply, 1916-1940 
 
 
MWD/GDP is the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio, computed by multiplying each debt payment 
by the corresponding maturity, summing across maturities, and scaling by GDP. LTD/GDP is the long-
term-debt-to-GDP ratio, computed by summing all debt payments with maturity beyond ten years, and 
scaling by GDP. M is the dollar-weighted average maturity expressed in years and divided by five (to fit 
into the picture). D/GDP is the ratio of the aggregate principal payments of all Treasury securities to 
GDP. MWD/GDP, LTD/GDP, and M are computed using aggregate principal payments.  
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Bond supply and excess bond returns 
 
Plots of three-year holding-period excess return on long-term government bonds (vertical axis) 
against the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio (horizontal axis). Panel A shows the 1952-2007 
period. Panel B shows the 1916-1941 period. 
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Bond supply, bond yields and bond returns: regression coefficients as a function of maturity 
 
We use the data provided by Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007) to obtain yields and one-year returns for zero-
coupon bonds with maturities between two and fifteen years during the November 1971-December 2007 period. 
For each maturity τ, we estimate monthly time-series regressions of the form: 
( ) (1)
( ) (1)
,
( / ) , and
( / ) .
t t t t
t k k t t t k
y a b MWD GDP cy u
r a b MWD GDP cy u



 
   
   
 
In the first equation the yield is regressed on the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio controlling for the one-
year yield. In the second equation the dependent variable is instead the one-year return. The figures below show 
the coefficients bτ as a function of τ, together with 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Panel A. Yields 
 
 
Panel B. Returns 
    
Figure 6 
Model calibration 
 
The solid and dashed lines plot the coefficients bτ from the monthly time-series regressions: 
( ) (1)
( ) (1)
,
/ ) , and
/ ) ,
(
(
t t t
t k k t t k
t
t
y a b MWD GDP cy u
r a b MWD GDP cy u



 
   
   
 
as a function of maturity τ ranging from two to fifteen years. In the first equation the one-year return of a zero-
coupon bond with maturity τ is regressed on the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio controlling for the one-
year yield. In the second equation the dependent variable is instead the bond’s yield. The solid lines are the 
coefficients derived from the model. The dashed lines are the coefficients when the regressions are performed on 
actual data during the 1971-2007 period. The risk aversion coefficient of arbitrageurs in the model is chosen so 
that the average across all points in the two solid lines is equal to the average across all points in the two 
dashed lines.  
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Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A summarizes the main sample 1952-2007. MWD/GDP is the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio. Its 
market-valued based version multiplies the market value of each bond by Macaulay duration, sums across bonds, 
and  scales  by  GDP.  LTD/GDP  is  the  long-term-debt-to-GDP  ratio.  Its  market-value  based  version  sums  the 
market values of all bonds with maturity beyond ten years, and scales by GDP. M is the dollar-weighted average 
maturity expressed in years. D/GDP is the ratio of the aggregate principal payments of all Treasury securities to 
GDP. y
(LT) is the yield of a long-term bond with approximate maturity twenty years and y
(1) is the one-year yield. 
r1, r2, and r3 are holding-period returns for the long-term bond over one-, three-, and five-year horizons, respectively. 
Output gap is the residual from a Hodrick-Prescott filter of log GDP. Output growth is the difference between log 
real GDP in the most recent quarter t and log real GDP in quarter t-4. Inflation risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly  inflation  over  the  past  year.  Interest-rate  risk  is  the  standard  deviation  of  the  monthly  short-term 
Treasury-bill yield over the past year.  Stock-market risk is the standard deviation of daily CRSP value-weighted 
stock returns over the past month. Change in arbitrageur wealth ΔW1
Arb is the product of the one-year lagged 
spread between the long-term and the one-year yield, times the subsequent one-year excess return of the long-term 
bond.  Change  in  arbitrageur  wealth  ΔW2
Arb  is  the  product  of  the  one-year  lagged  MWD/GDP,  times  the 
subsequent one-year excess return of the long-term bond. Panel B summarizes the pre-war sample 1916-1940.  
 
 
Panel A. Main sample 1952-2007 
 
Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Measures of Debt Maturity and Debt Supply: 
MWD/GDP  2.284  2.142  0.997  0.671  4.275 
MWD/GDP (MV-based)  1.050  1.117  0.444  0.338  2.127 
LTD/GDP  0.077  0.070  0.038  0.019  0.149 
LTD/GDP (MV-based)  0.047  0.046  0.025  0.011  0.116 
M  5.387  5.511  1.016  3.269  7.024 
D/GDP  0.313  0.322  0.073  0.175  0.452 
Returns and Yields: 
y
(LT)  0.063  0.060  0.025  0.026  0.138 
y
(LT)-y
(1)  0.008  0.008  0.012  -0.032  0.041 
y
(1)  0.055  0.053  0.029  0.006  0.158 
r1  0.062  0.049  0.093  -0.187  0.434 
r3  0.189  0.187  0.165  -0.187  0.680 
r5  0.320  0.312  0.232  -0.166  1.100 
Macroeconomic Conditions and Other Controls: 
Output gap  0.000  0.000  0.016  -0.048  0.038 
Output growth  0.033  0.033  0.024  -0.031  0.091 
Inflation  0.038  0.031  0.028  -0.009  0.138 
Inflation risk  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.006 
Interest-rate risk  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.001  0.035 
Stock-market risk  0.007  0.006  0.004  0.002  0.049 
MWD/GDP (Fed adjusted)  2.154  2.044  1.001  0.555  4.134 
Arbitrageur Wealth: 
ΔW1
Arb  0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.004  0.007 
ΔW2
Arb  0.040  0.006  0.225  -0.673  0.958 
 
 
 
    
Table I Continued 
 
 
 
Panel B. Pre-war sample 1916-1940 
 
 
Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
           
MWD/GDP  3.062  3.500  0.974  0.552  4.264 
LTD/GDP  0.128  0.151  0.045  0.022  0.181 
M  12.857  12.307  3.572  9.153  23.377 
D/GDP  0.250  0.238  0.104  0.024  0.426 
y
(LT)  0.035  0.036  0.008  0.022  0.055 
y
(1)  0.023  0.029  0.019  0.000  0.058 
r1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
r3  0.031  0.035  0.010  0.006  0.043 
           
 
 
 Table 2 
Bond supply, bond yields and bond returns 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form:  
( ) (1)
( ) (1)
,
t t t t
t k k t t t k
y a bX cy u
r a bX cy u



   
   
 
The dependent variable is the yield or the one-year, three-year, or five-year return of the τ-year bond. The independent variable Xt is MWD/GDP, the 
maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio, or LTD/GDP, the long-term-debt-to-GDP ratio. The regressions control for the one-year yield. The first set of t-
statistics, reported in brackets, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags in the case of the yield and one-year return regressions, and 54 and 90 
lags in the case of the three- and five-year return regressions. The second set of t-statistics are based on modeling the error process as AR(1) for the yield 
regressions, and as ARMA(1,k) for the return regressions where k denotes the number of months in the return cumulation (e.g., twelve for the one-year 
return).  
 
    X=MWD/GDP  X= LTD/GDP 
   b  [t NW]  [t AR]  c  [t NW]  [t AR]  R
2  b  [t NW]  [t AR]  c  [t NW]  [t AR]  R
2 
                              
 Yield spreads:                             
 Yield 2-yr bond  0.001  [2.597]  [2.363]
] 
0.981  [50.113]  [70.970]
0 
0.987  0.029  [2.476]  [2.293]  0.982  [49.381]  [69.955]  0.987 
 Yield 3-yr bond  0.002  [2.510]  [1.881]  0.951  [29.510]  [36.999]  0.968  0.044  [2.364]  [1.811]  0.952  [29.150]  [36.591]  0.968 
 Yield 4-yr bond  0.002  [2.497]  [1.805]  0.932  [22.657]  [30.645]  0.949  0.058  [2.356]  [1.772]  0.934  [22.419]  [30.362]  0.948 
 Yield 5-yr bond  0.002  [2.358]  [1.580]  0.913  [19.528]  [23.621]  0.933  0.064  [2.258]  [1.601]  0.914  [19.387]  [23.506]  0.932 
 Yield LT bond  0.004  [2.682]  [1.719]  0.795  [12.167]  [12.993]  0.379  0.107  [2.610]  [1.822]  0.797  [12.234]  [13.253]  0.374 
                              
 Returns:                             
 1-year return 2-yr 
bond 
0.004  [1.979]  [1.438]  1.114  [12.201]  [11.290]  0.774  0.116  [2.176]  [1.590]  1.118  [12.214]  [11.245]  0.776 
 1-year return 3-yr 
bond 
0.007  [1.860]  [1.512]  1.134  [6.751]  [6.847]  0.507  0.191  [2.013]  [1.627]  1.140  [6.750]  [6.804]  0.509 
 1-year return 4-yr 
bond 
0.010  [1.964]  [1.774]  1.157  [4.864]  [4.535]  0.358  0.266  [2.084]  [1.867]  1.166  [4.855]  [4.495]  0.360 
 1-year return 5-yr 
bond 
0.011  [1.902]  [1.852]  1.145  [3.897]  [4.172]  0.263  0.308  [2.012]  [1.913]  1.154  [3.897]  [4.132]  0.265 
 1-year return LT bond  0.026  [3.097]  [3.462]  1.212  [2.846]  [3.181]  0.190  0.685  [3.196]  [3.468]  1.229  [2.860]  [3.142]  0.189 
 3-year return LT bond  0.065  [4.200]  [4.121]  3.737  [4.971]  [4.587]  0.506  1.786  [4.200]  [4.284]  3.795  [5.039]  [4.627]  0.516 
 5-year return LT bond  0.094  [5.421]  [3.580]  6.139  [5.401]  [4.650]  0.658  2.625  [5.340]  [4.068]  6.235  [5.612]  [5.062]  0.675 
                               
 
 Table 3 
Bond supply, bond yields and bond returns: regression coefficients as a function of maturity 
 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form:  
( ) (1)
( ) (1)
,
( / ) , and
( / ) .
t t t t
t k k t t t k
y a b MWD GDP cy u
r a b MWD GDP cy u



 
   
   
 
for each maturity τ between two and fifteen years, during the 1971-2007 period. The dependent variable is the 
yield  or  the  one-year  return  of  the  τ-year  bond.  The  independent  variable  is  MWD/GDP,  the  maturity-
weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio. The regressions control for the one-year yield. The first set of t-statistics, reported 
in brackets, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags. The second set of t-statistics are based on 
modeling the error process as AR(1) for the yield regressions, and as ARMA(1,12) for the return regressions. 
 
    Yields  1-yr returns 
    b  [t NW]  [t AR]  R
2  b  [t NW]  [t AR]  R
2 
  τ=                 
  2-yr  0.0009  [2.051]  [1.567]  0.985  0.005  [2.143]  [1.484]  0.752 
  3-yr  0.0014  [2.016]  [1.360]  0.961  0.008  [2.134]  [1.659]  0.489 
  4-yr  0.0017  [2.045]  [1.303]  0.938  0.011  [2.223]  [1.881]  0.339 
  5-yr  0.0020  [2.087]  [1.280]  0.916  0.014  [2.340]  [2.088]  0.254 
  6-yr  0.0023  [2.133]  [1.271]  0.898  0.016  [2.459]  [2.267]  0.203 
  7-yr  0.0025  [2.178]  [1.270]  0.882  0.019  [2.569]  [2.421]  0.171 
  8-yr  0.0026  [2.222]  [1.275]  0.868  0.022  [2.663]  [2.555]  0.151 
  9-yr  0.0028  [2.263]  [1.286]  0.856  0.024  [2.740]  [2.671]  0.137 
  10-yr  0.0029  [2.301]  [1.301]  0.846  0.027  [2.800]  [2.772]  0.128 
  11-yr  0.0030  [2.334]  [1.319]  0.836  0.029  [2.845]  [2.858]  0.121 
  12-yr  0.0030  [2.363]  [1.338]  0.827  0.032  [2.878]  [2.933]  0.115 
  13-yr  0.0031  [2.386]  [1.356]  0.819  0.034  [2.901]  [2.998]  0.111 
  14-yr  0.0032  [2.403]  [1.373]  0.812  0.037  [2.916]  [3.054]  0.107 
  15-yr  0.0032  [2.414]  [1.388]]
8] 
0.805  0.039  [2.926]  [3.104]  0.104 
                    
Table 4 
Instrumental-variables tests 
 
We instrument for the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio by the Treasury-debt-to-GDP ratio. Both the first- 
and second-stage regressions are monthly and include a control for the one-year yield. The dependent variable in 
the  second-stage  regression  is  the  yield  or  one-year  return  of  the  long-term  bond.  t-statistics,  reported  in 
parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags in the case of the yield and one-year return 
regressions, and 54 lags in the case of the three-year return regression.  
 
First stage regressions:
 
(1) ( / ) ( / ) t t t t t X MWD GDP D GDP y u          
 
  Instrument = D/GDP  
D/GDP  14.186 
  [12.33] 
y
(1)  12.809 
  [4.08] 
R
2  0.835 
 
 
Second stage regressions:
 
( ) (1)
( ) (1)
,
ˆ , and
ˆ
LT
t t t t
LT
t k k t t t k
y a bX y u
r a bX y u 
   
   
 
 
 
Yield  1-year return  3-year return 
MWD/GDP (IV)  0.002  0.028  0.067 
  [1.129]  [2.885]  [3.493] 
y
(1)  0.845  1.223  3.748 
  [11.600]  [2.868]  [4.923] 
R
2  0.849  0.189  0.506 
 
 
   Table 5 
Robustness tests 
 
OLS and instrumental-variables monthly time-series regressions of the form: 
( ) (1)
, ( / )
LT
t k k t t t k t r a b MWD GDP cy dZ u      
 
where Z denotes a control that includes the term spread, output gap, output growth, inflation, inflation risk, 
interest-rate risk and stock-market risk. The dependent variable is the one- or three-year return of the long-term 
bond. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags in the case of 
the one-year return regression and 54 lags in the case of three-year return regression.  
 
    1-year return  3-year return 
    b  [t]  R
2  b  [t]  R
2 
               
(1)  Base case: control for short rate only  0.026  [3.097]  0.190  0.065  [4.200]  0.506 
               
  Market value based measures of supply:             
(2)  MWD/GDP MV (OLS)  0.003  [1.748]  0.136  0.011  [2.269]  0.426 
(3)  MWD/GDP MV (IV)  0.007  [2.671]  0.114  0.016  [3.110]  0.409 
(4)  LTD/GDP MV (OLS)  0.894  [2.586]  0.155  2.887  [3.728]  0.489 
(5)  LTD/GDP MV (IV)  1.395  [2.837]  0.142  3.317  [3.448]  0.486 
               
  Macroeconomic and other controls:             
(6)  Add control for term spread  0.014  [1.892]  0.281  0.046  [2.422]  0.582 
(7)  Add control for output gap  0.026  [3.399]  0.207  0.065  [4.308]  0.536 
(8)  Add control for output gr.  0.026  [3.165]  0.188  0.066  [4.376]  0.522 
(9)  Add control for inflation  0.020  [2.680]  0.210  0.061  [4.511]  0.509 
(10)  Add control for inflation risk  0.027  [3.124]  0.191  0.076  [4.809]  0.588 
(11)  Add control for interest-rate risk  0.026  [3.126]  0.189  0.068  [4.358]  0.519 
(12)  Add control for stock-market risk  0.026  [3.101]  0.194  0.064  [4.324]  0.538 
(13)  Time trend control  0.020  [2.343]  0.215  0.045  [2.892]  0.594 
(14)  Future changes in debt maturity  0.027  [3.198]  0.202  0.067  [4.402]  0.524 
(15)  Adjust MWD for fed holdings  0.027  [3.120]  0.199  0.660  [4.242]  0.516 
(16)  Annual sampling (September)  0.028  [3.085]  0.183  0.072  [4.106]  0.505 
(17)  Annual sampling (December)  0.023  [2.524]  0.139  0.060  [3.538]  0.456 
 Table 6 
Bond supply, bond yields and bond returns, 1916-1940 
 
Annual time-series regressions of the form:  
( ) (1)
( ) (1)
,
/
/
LT
t t t t
LT
t k k t t t k
y a bMWD GDP cy u
r a bMWD GDP cy u 
   
   
 
during the 1916-1940 period (with one-year returns extending to 1941 and three-year returns extending to 1943). 
The data are sampled at the end of June. The dependent variable is the yield or the one- or three-year return of 
the long-term bond. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard errors with three 
lags in the case of the yield and one-year return regressions, and five lags in the case of the three-year return 
regression.  
 
 
Yield  Returns 
    1-year return  3-year return 
       
MWD/GDP  0.001  0.008  0.029 
 
[1.310]  [0.988]  [5.528] 
y
(1)  0.379  0.035  1.169 
 
[5.216]  [0.103]  [2.778] 
R
2  0.698  0.043  0.448 
 Table 7 
Bond supply, bond returns, and arbitrageur wealth 
 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form: 
( ) (1) ( ) (1) (1) ()
, ( ) ( ) //
LT LT
t t t t t t k
LT Arb Arb
t k k t t t a b y y y y y u r MWD GDP c e W MWD GDP f W g
              
The dependent variable is the one- or three-year return of the long-term bond. The independent variables include the spread between the long-term and the one-
year  yield,  MWD/GDP, and interactions between  these  variables  and  changes  in  arbitrageur  wealth.  We  use  two  measures  of  arbitrageur  wealth.  The  first 
measure, ΔW1
Arb, is the product of the one-year lagged spread between the long-term and the one-year yield, times the subsequent one-year excess return of the 
long-term bond. The second measure, ΔW2
Arb, is the product of the one-year lagged MWD/GDP, times the subsequent one-year excess return of the long-term 
bond. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags in the case of the one-year return regression and 54 lags in the 
case of three-year return regression.  
  1-year return  3-year return 
MWD/GDP  0.026  0.031  0.034        0.065  0.067  0.069       
  [3.102]  [3.408]  [3.634]        [4.210]  [4.252]  [4.268]       
y
(LT)- y
(1) 
     
3.443  4.26  4.114        6.46  7.076  6.819 
 
     
[5.136]  [5.190]  [5.633]        [4.710]  [4.611]  [4.375] 
1 /
Arb W MWD GDP   
 
-4.729 
 
        -1.971         
 
 
[-3.386] 
 
        [-1.221]         
2 /
Arb W MWD GDP   
   
-0.029            -0.013       
 
   
[-3.114]            [-1.422]       
( ) (1)
1 ()
Arb LT W y y     
     
  -675.811            -509.326   
 
     
  [-2.774]            [-2.404]   
( ) (1)
2 ()
Arb LT W y y     
     
    -5.226            -2.792 
 
     
    [-2.954]            [-1.153] 
y
(1)  1.214  1.146  1.130  1.894  1.838  1.989  3.741  3.713  3.703  4.945  4.903  4.995 
  [2.791]  [2.587]  [2.489]  [5.405]  [5.406]  [5.918]  [4.830]  [4.806]  [4.670]  [6.994]  [7.059]  [6.862] 
R
2  0.190  0.239  0.238  0.265  0.309  0.307  0.503  0.505  0.506  0.518  0.526  0.522 
 
 APPENDIX
A Proofs of Theoretical Results
Proof of Lemma 1: Using (8), we can write (2) as
dWt =
(
Wtrt +
∫ T
0
x
()
t (µ
()
t − rt)dτ
)
dt−
(∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ
)
σrdBr;t−
(∫ T
0
x
()
t A(τ)dτ
)
σdB;t,
and (3) as
max
{x
()
t }∈(0;T]
[∫ T
0
x
()
t (µ
()
t − rt)dτ −
aσ2
r
2
(∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ
)2
−
aσ2

2
(∫ T
0
x
()
t A(τ)dτ
)2]
. (A.1)
Point-wise maximization of (A.1) yields (10).
We next show two useful lemmas.
Lemma A.1. If a function g(τ) is positive and increasing, then
∫ T
0 g(τ)θ(τ)dτ > 0.
Proof: We can write the integral
∫ T
0 g(τ)θ(τ)dτ as
∫ T
0
g(τ)θ(τ)dτ =
∫ ∗
0
g(τ)θ(τ)dτ +
∫ T
∗
g(τ)θ(τ)dτ
> g(τ∗)
∫ ∗
0
θ(τ)dτ + g(τ∗)
∫ T
∗
θ(τ)dτ
= g(τ∗)
∫ T
0
θ(τ)dτ ≥ 0,
where the second step follows from Part (ii) of Assumption 1 and because g(τ) is increasing, and
the last step follows from Part (i) of Assumption 1 and because g(τ) is positive.
Lemma A.2. The functions Ar(τ) and A(τ), given by (13) and (14), respectively, are positive
and increasing. For A(τ), this holds for any value of ˆ κ, and not only for ˆ κ solutions to (16).
Proof: Eq. (13) implies that Ar(τ) is positive and increasing. Therefore, Lemma A.1 implies that
1Ir > 0 and Z > 0. To show that A(τ) is positive and increasing, we write it as
A(τ) = Z
∫ 
0
1 − e−rˆ 
κr
e−ˆ (−ˆ )dˆ τ. (A.2)
Since Z > 0, (A.2) implies that A(τ) is positive. Diﬀerentiating (A.2), we ﬁnd
A′
(τ) = Z
(
1 − e−r
κr
− ˆ κ
∫ 
0
1 − e−rˆ 
κr
e−ˆ (−ˆ )dˆ τ
)
. (A.3)
If ˆ κ ≤ 0, (A.3) implies that
A′
(τ) ≥ Z
1 − e−r
κr
> 0.
If ˆ κ > 0, (A.3) implies that
A′
(τ) > Z
1 − e−r
κr
(
1 − ˆ κ
∫ 
0
e−ˆ (−ˆ )dˆ τ
)
= Z
1 − e−r
κr
e−ˆ  > 0,
since Ar(τ) is increasing in τ. Therefore, in both cases, A(τ) is increasing in τ.
Proof of Theorem 1: Substituting x
()
t from (4) and (12) into (11), we ﬁnd
λi;t = aσ2
i
∫ T
0
[ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt]Ai(τ)dτ. (A.4)
Substituting µ
()
t and λi;t from (9) and (A.4) into (10), we ﬁnd an aﬃne equation in (rt,βt).
Identifying terms in rt yields
κrAr(τ) + A′
r(τ) − 1 = 0, (A.5)
identifying terms in βt yields
κA(τ) + A′
(τ) = aσ2
rAr(τ)
∫ T
0
Ar(τ)θ(τ)dτ + aσ2
A(τ)
∫ T
0
A(τ)θ(τ)dτ, (A.6)
2and identifying constant terms yields
C′(τ)−κr¯ rAr(τ)+
σ2
r
2
Ar(τ)2+
σ2

2
A(τ)2 = aσ2
rAr(τ)
∫ T
0
Ar(τ)ζ(τ)dτ+aσ2
A(τ)
∫ T
0
A(τ)ζ(τ)dτ.
(A.7)
The ordinary diﬀerential equations (ODEs) (A.5)-(A.7) must be solved with the initial condition
Ar(0) = A(0) = C(0) = 0. The solution to (A.5) is (13). Using (13) and the deﬁnitions of Ir and
Z, we can write (A.6) as
ˆ κA(τ) + A′
(τ) = Z
1 − e−r
κr
, (A.8)
where
ˆ κ ≡ κ − aσ2

∫ T
0
A(τ)θ(τ)dτ. (A.9)
The solution to (A.8) is (14). Substituting into (A.9), we ﬁnd that ˆ κ is given by (16). The solution
to (A.7) is
C(τ) = Zr
∫ 
0
Ar(τ′)dτ′ + Z
∫ 
0
A(τ′)dτ′ −
σ2
r
2
∫ 
0
Ar(τ′)2dτ′ −
σ2

2
∫ 
0
A(τ′)2dτ′, (A.10)
where
Zr ≡ κr¯ r + aσ2
r
∫ T
0
1 − e−r
κr
ζ(τ)dτ,
Z ≡ Zaσ2

∫ T
0
1
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
ζ(τ)dτ.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we must show that (16) has a solution for a below a
threshold ¯ a > 0. Since the function A(τ) is positive and increasing from Lemma A.2, Lemma
A.1 implies that the second term in the right-hand side of (16) is positive. Therefore, any solution
to (16) must satisfy ˆ κ < κ. When ˆ κ = κ, the left-hand side of (16) is equal to κ and the
right-hand side is smaller than κ. When instead ˆ κ goes to −∞, both left- and right-hand side
go to −∞, but the right-hand side converges at the rate −e
−^ T
ˆ 2

which is faster than the rate ˆ κ
3at which the left-hand side converges. Therefore, (16) has an even number of solutions, possibly
zero. A suﬃcient condition for (16) to have a solution is that the left-hand side is smaller than the
right-hand side for ˆ κ = 0, i.e.,
κ − a2σ2
rσ2
Ir
∫ T
0
1
κr
(
τ −
1 − e−r
κr
)
θ(τ)dτ > 0
⇔ a <
     
 
κ
σ2
rσ2
Ir
∫ T
0
1
r
(
τ − 1−e−r
r
)
θ(τ)dτ
. (A.11)
Thus, (16) has a solution when a is smaller than the threshold ¯ a > 0 deﬁned as the right-hand side
of (A.11).
Proof of Proposition 1: Since the yield of the bond with maturity τ at time t is
y
()
t ≡ −
log
(
P
()
t
)
τ
=
Ar(τ)rt + A(τ)βt + C(τ)
τ
, (A.12)
the eﬀect of a shock to βt is
∂y
()
t
∂βt
=
A(τ)
τ
. (A.13)
Since the function A(τ) is positive, the eﬀect in (A.13) is positive. To determine how the eﬀect
depends on maturity, we diﬀerentiate with respect to τ:
d
(
A()

)
dτ
=
τA′
(τ) − A(τ)
τ2 .
The function τ → τA′
(τ)−A(τ) is zero for τ = 0. Its derivative is τA′′
(τ). Diﬀerentiating (A.3),
we ﬁnd
A′′
(τ) = Z
(
e−r − ˆ κ
1 − e−r
κr
+ ˆ κ2

∫ 
0
1 − e−rˆ 
κr
e−ˆ (−ˆ )dˆ τ
)
.
The function A′′
(τ) has the same sign as
F(τ) ≡ e(ˆ −r) − ˆ κ
eˆ  − e(ˆ −r)
κr
+ ˆ κ2

∫ 
0
1 − e−rˆ 
κr
eˆ ˆ dˆ τ.
4Since F(0) > 0 and
F′(τ) = (ˆ κ − κr)e(ˆ −r) − ˆ κ
ˆ κeˆ  − (ˆ κ − κr)e(ˆ −r)
κr
+ ˆ κ2

1 − e−r
κr
eˆ 
= −κre(ˆ −r) < 0,
the function F(τ) is either positive or positive and then negative, and the same is true for A′′
(τ).
Therefore, the function τA′
(τ)−A(τ) is either increasing or increasing and then decreasing. Since
it is zero for τ = 0, it is either positive or positive and then negative. Hence, the function A(τ)/τ
is either increasing or increasing and then decreasing, which means that the eﬀect of a shock to βt
on yields is either increasing or hump-shaped across maturities.
Proof of Proposition 2: Eqs. (10) and (A.4) imply that the eﬀect of a shock to βt on the
instantaneous expected return of the bond with maturity τ at time t is
∂µ
()
t
∂βt
= aσ2
rAr(τ)
∫ T
0
Ar(τ)θ(τ)dτ + aσ2
rA(τ)
∫ T
0
A(τ)θ(τ)dτ. (A.14)
Since the functions Ar(τ) and A(τ) are positive and increasing from Lemma A.2, Lemma A.1
implies that the two integrals in (A.14) are positive. This property, together with Ar(τ) and A(τ)
being positive and increasing, imply that the eﬀect in (A.14) is positive and increasing across
maturities.
Proof of Proposition 3: Eqs. (A.6) and (A.14) imply that
A(τ) =
∫ 
0
∂µ
(ˆ )
t
∂βt
e−(−ˆ )dˆ τ <
∂µ
()
t
∂βt
1 − e−
κ
, (A.15)
where the second step follows because Proposition 2 implies that ∂µ
()
t /∂βt is increasing in τ.
Combining (A.13) and (A.15), we ﬁnd
∂y
()
t
∂βt
<
∂µ
()
t
∂βt
1 − e−
κτ
<
∂µ
()
t
∂βt
,
where the second step follows because κ > 0. Hence, the eﬀect of a shock to βt on yields is smaller
than on instantaneous expected returns.
Proof of Proposition 4: Since the right-hand side of (16) is decreasing in a, the largest solution
5for ˆ κ is decreasing in a. Eq. (A.2) then implies that the function A(τ) is increasing in a, and
(13) and (A.14) imply that the eﬀect of βt on instantaneous expected returns is increasing in a.
B Extensions and Calibration
B.1 Hedging Demand
In this section we modify arbitrageurs’ preferences to introduce a hedging demand. We replace the
optimization problem (3) by
max
{x
()
t }∈(0;T]
[
Et(dWt) −
a
2
[V art(dWt) + ΨCovt(dWt,dRt)]
]
, (B.1)
where dRt is a portfolio return with loadings Λr and Λ, respectively, on the shocks dBr;t and dB;t.
The covariance term can be given multiple interpretations. For example, arbitrageurs could be
asset managers tracking a benchmark portfolio. Their optimization problem would then be
max
{x
()
t }∈(0;T]
[
Et(dWt) −
a
2
V art(dWt − WtdRt)
]
, (B.2)
where Rt is the return on the benchmark portfolio. Alternatively, arbitrageurs could be pension-
fund managers hedging a ﬁxed-term liability. Their optimization problem would then be (B.2),
where Wt is replaced by the market value Lt of the liability and Rt is the return on Lt. These
optimization problems are equivalent to (B.1) provided that Ψt = −2Wt in the ﬁrst case and Ψ =
−2Lt in the second case. If Wt and Lt are constant over time because managers form overlapping
generations that start with the same wealth and liabilities, then Ψ is constant. Moreover, if dRt
is a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds with weights that are constant over time, then Λr and Λ are
constant.
Introducing a hedging demand aﬀects only the function C(τ) in the equilibrium derived in
Section 2, but not the functions Ar(τ) and A(τ). Therefore, Propositions 1-4 continue to hold.
Theorem B.1. The functions Ar(τ) and A(τ) are given by (13) and (14), respectively. The
function C(τ) is given by (A.10) with Zr and Z given by (B.9) and (B.10), respectively.
Proof of Theorem B.1: With a hedging demand, the arbitrageurs’ optimization problem (A.1)
6is replaced by
max
{x
()
t }∈(0;T]
[∫ T
0
x
()
t (µ
()
t − rt)dτ −
aσ2
r
2
(∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ
)2
−
aσ2

2
(∫ T
0
x
()
t A(τ)dτ
)2
−
aΨσrΛr
2
∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ −
aΨσΛ
2
∫ T
0
x
()
t A(τ)dτ
]
. (B.3)
Point-wise maximization of (B.3) yields the ﬁrst-order condition (10), with (11) replaced by
λr;t ≡ aσ2
r
∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ +
aΨσrΛr
2
, (B.4)
λ;t ≡ aσ2

∫ T
0
x
()
t A(τ)dτ +
aΨσΛ
2
. (B.5)
Substituting x
()
t from (4) and (12) into (B.15) and (B.16), we ﬁnd
λr;t ≡ aσ2
r
∫ T
0
[ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt]Ar(τ)dτ +
aΨσrΛr
2
, (B.6)
λ;t ≡ aσ2

∫ T
0
[ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt]A(τ)dτ +
aΨσΛ
2
. (B.7)
Substituting µ
()
t , λr;t and λ;t from (9), (B.6) and (B.7) into (10), we ﬁnd an aﬃne equation in
(rt,βt). Identifying terms in rt and βt yields (A.5) and (A.6), respectively. Identifying constant
terms yields
C′(τ) − κr¯ rAr(τ) +
σ2
r
2
Ar(τ)2 +
σ2

2
A(τ)2
= aσ2
rAr(τ)
∫ T
0
Ar(τ)ζ(τ)dτ + aσ2
A(τ)
∫ T
0
A(τ)ζ(τ)dτ +
aΨσrΛr
2
Ar(τ) +
aΨσΛ
2
A(τ).
(B.8)
The solutions to (A.5) and (A.6) are (13) and (14), respectively. The solution to (B.8) is (A.10)
with
Zr ≡ κr¯ r + aσ2
r
∫ T
0
1 − e−r
κr
ζ(τ)dτ +
aΨσrΛr
2
, (B.9)
Z ≡ Zaσ2

∫ T
0
1
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
ζ(τ)dτ +
aΨσΛ
2
. (B.10)
7Hence, the functions Ar(τ), A(τ) and C(τ) are as in the theorem’s statement.
B.2 Correlated Short Rate and Supply Factor
In this section we study the case where the short rate rt and the supply factor βt are correlated.
Correlation aﬀects the functions A(τ) and C(τ) in the equilibrium derived in Section 2, but not
the function Ar(τ).
Theorem B.2. The functions Ar(τ) and A(τ) are given by (13) and (14), respectively, where
Z ≡
a(σ2
r + σ2
r)Ir − κrγ
1 − aσrσ
∫ T
0
1
r
(
1−e
−^ 
ˆ  − e−r−e
−^ 
ˆ −r
)
θ(τ)dτ
,
Ir is given by (15), and ˆ κ solves
ˆ κ = κ−aσrσIr−
(
a(σ2
r + σ2
r)Ir − κrγ
)
aσ2

∫ T
0
1
r
(
1−e
−^ 
ˆ  − e−r−e
−^ 
ˆ −r
)
θ(τ)dτ
1 − aσrσ
∫ T
0
1
r
(
1−e
−^ 
ˆ  − e−r−e
−^ 
ˆ −r
)
θ(τ)dτ
. (B.11)
Eq. (B.11) has a solution if a is below a threshold ¯ a > 0. The function C(τ) is given by (B.23).
Proof of Theorem B.2: In the correlated case, (8) is replaced by
dP
()
t
P
()
t
= µ
()
t dt − Ar(τ)σrdBr;t − (Ar(τ)σr + A(τ)σ)dB;t, (B.12)
where
µ
()
t =A′
r(τ)rt + A′
(τ)βt + C′(τ) + Ar(τ)κr(rt − ¯ r + γβt) + A(τ)κβt
+
1
2
Ar(τ)2(σ2
r + σ2
r) +
1
2
A(τ)2σ2
 + Ar(τ)A(τ)σrσ. (B.13)
The arbitrageurs’ optimization problem (A.1) is replaced by
max
{x
()
t }∈(0;T]
[∫ T
0
x
()
t (µ
()
t − rt)dτ −
aσ2
r
2
(∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ
)2
−
a
2
(∫ T
0
x
()
t (σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))dτ
)2]
.
(B.14)
8Point-wise maximization of (B.14) yields the ﬁrst-order condition (10), with (11) replaced by
λr;t ≡ aσ2
r
∫ T
0
x
()
t Ar(τ)dτ + aσr
∫ T
0
x
()
t (σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))dτ, (B.15)
λ;t ≡ aσ
∫ T
0
x
()
t (σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))dτ. (B.16)
Substituting x
()
t from (4) and (12) into (B.15) and (B.16), we ﬁnd
λr;t ≡ aσ2
r
∫ T
0
[ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt]Ar(τ)dτ + aσr
∫ T
0
[ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt](σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))dτ,
(B.17)
λ;t ≡ aσ
∫ T
0
[ζ(τ) + θ(τ)βt](σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))dτ. (B.18)
Substituting µ
()
t , λr;t and λ;t from (9), (B.17) and (B.18) into (10), we ﬁnd an aﬃne equation in
(rt,βt). Identifying terms in rt yields (A.5), identifying terms in βt yields
κrγAr(τ) + κA(τ) + A′
(τ)
=aσ2
rAr(τ)
∫ T
0
Ar(τ)θ(τ)dτ + a(σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))
∫ T
0
(σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))θ(τ)dτ,
(B.19)
and identifying constant terms yields
C′(τ) − κr¯ rAr(τ) +
σ2
r + σ2
r
2
Ar(τ)2 +
σ2

2
A(τ)2 + σrσAr(τ)A(τ)
= aσ2
rAr(τ)
∫ T
0
Ar(τ)ζ(τ)dτ + a(σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))
∫ T
0
(σrAr(τ) + σA(τ))ζ(τ)dτ.
(B.20)
The solution to (A.5) is (13). Using (13) and the deﬁnition of Ir, we can write (A.6) as
ˆ κA(τ) + A′
(τ) =
[
a(σ2
r + σ2
r) + aσrσ
∫ T
0
A(τ)θ(τ)dτ − κrγ
]
1 − e−r
κr
, (B.21)
9where
ˆ κ ≡ κ − a
(
σrσIr + σ2

∫ T
0
A(τ)θ(τ)dτ
)
. (B.22)
The solution to (A.8) is (14), with Z given by
Z = a(σ2
r + σ2
r) + ZσσrI − κrγ
and hence as in the theorem’s statement. Substituting into (B.22), we ﬁnd that ˆ κ is given by
(B.11). The solution to (B.20) is
C(τ) =Zr
∫ 
0
Ar(τ′)dτ′ + Z
∫ 
0
A(τ′)dτ′
−
σ2
r + σ2
r
2
∫ 
0
Ar(τ′)2dτ′ −
σ2

2
∫ 
0
A(τ′)2dτ′ −
σrσ
2
∫ 
0
Ar(τ′)A(τ′)dτ′, (B.23)
where
Zr ≡ κr¯ r + a(σ2
r + σ2
r)
∫ T
0
1 − e−r
κr
ζ(τ)dτ + Zaσrσ
∫ T
0
1
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
ζ(τ)dτ,
Z ≡ aσrσ
∫ T
0
1 − e−r
κr
ζ(τ)dτ + Zaσ2

∫ T
0
1
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
ζ(τ)dτ.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we must show that (B.11) has a solution for a below a
threshold ¯ a > 0. When κ goes to ∞, the left-hand side of (B.11) goes to ∞ and the right-hand
side goes to the ﬁnite limit κ − aσrσIr. A suﬃcient condition for (B.11) to have a solution is
that (i) the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side for ˆ κ = 0, and (ii) the denominator
in the right-hand side is bounded away from zero for ˆ κ ∈ [0,∞), which implies that the right-hand
side is a continuous function of ˆ κ over [0,∞). Since (i) is satisﬁed for a = 0, it is also satisﬁed for
a below a threshold ¯ a1 > 0. Since the function
ˆ κ −→
∫ T
0
1
κr
(
1 − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ
−
e−r − e−ˆ 
ˆ κ − κr
)
θ(τ)dτ
converges to zero when ˆ κ goes to ∞, it has a ﬁnite supremum on [0,∞). Therefore, (ii) is satisﬁed
for a below a threshold ¯ a2 > 0.
10B.3 Calibration
We compute maturity-weighted debt to GDP in face value terms, i.e., use our main measure of
supply. Since our supply factor βt has zero mean but our supply measure does not, we de-mean
our measure. We discretize (5) and (6) with step ∆t as follows
βt+∆t = (1 − κ∆t)βt + σ(B;t+∆t − B;t), (B.24)
rt+∆t = κr¯ r∆t + (1 − κr∆t)rt − κrγ∆tβt + σr(Br;t+∆t − Br;t) + σr(B;t+∆t − B;t), (B.25)
and perform the vector auto-regression
βt+∆t = cβt + ϵ;t+∆t, (B.26)
rt+∆t = c + crrt + crβt + ϵr;+∆t. (B.27)
The regression results are in Table B.1.
c cr cr
Coeﬃcient 0.99824 0.98322 -0.00025
Standard error 0.02264 0.00655 0.00019
Covariance matrix of residuals ϵ;t+∆t ϵr;t+∆t
ϵ;t+∆t 0.003412 0.000008
ϵr;t+∆t 0 0.000023
Table B.1: Results from the vector auto-regression (B.26) and (B.27).
11Comparing (B.26) and (B.27) with (B.24) and (B.25), we ﬁnd
κ =
1 − c
∆t
, (B.28)
κr =
1 − cr
∆t
, (B.29)
γ = −
cr
κr∆t
, (B.30)
σ =
√
Var(ϵ;t)
∆t
, (B.31)
σr =
Cov(ϵ;t,ϵr;t)
σ∆t
, (B.32)
σr =
√
Var(ϵr;t)
∆t
− σ2
r. (B.33)
Substituting the results from Table B.1 into (B.28)-(B.33), and setting the discretization step ∆t
to 1/12 because we use monthly data, we can compute (κ,κr,γ,σ,σr,σr). The results are in
Table B.2.
κ κr γ σ σr σr
0.021 0.201 0.015 0.202 0.017 0.001
Table B.2: Estimated parameters for the supply-factor process (5) and the short-rate process (6).
To estimate the function θ(τ), we express supply at any given maturity in face value terms (as
we do for maturity-weighted debt to GDP). We plot the function θ(τ) in Figure C.2 in Appendix
C.
Proposition B.1 computes the model-implied coeﬃcients of supply in our basic yield and return
regressions. These coeﬃcients are not identical to the eﬀects of supply derived in Propositions 1
and 2 because (i) the short rate and the supply factor can be correlated, (ii) we are controlling for
the one-year yield rather than for the instantaneous short rate, and (iii) we are regressing one-year
returns rather than instantaneous returns.
Proposition B.1. The regression (19) of the τ-year yield y
()
t on the supply factor βt and the
one-year yield y
(1)
t produces a coeﬃcient
b =
A(τ)
τ
−
Ar(τ)A(1)
τAr(1)
(B.34)
12on the supply factor. The regression (20) of the future one-year return r
()
t+1 of the τ-year bond on
the supply factor βt and the one-year yield y
(1)
t produces a coeﬃcient
b = A(τ) − e−A(τ − 1) − A(1) + κrγ
e− − e−r
κr − κ
Ar(τ − 1). (B.35)
on the supply factor.
Proof of Proposition B.1: Using (A.12), we can write (19) as
Ar(τ)rt + A(τ)βt + C(τ)
τ
= a + bβt + c(Ar(1)rt + A(1)βt + C(1)) + ut. (B.36)
The two independent variables account for all the variation in the dependent variable, and hence
ut = 0. Identifying terms in rt and βt, we ﬁnd
Ar(τ)
τ
= cAr(1) ⇒ c =
Ar(τ)
τAr(1)
,
A(τ)
τ
= b + cA(1) ⇒ b =
A(τ)
τ
−
Ar(τ)A(1)
τAr(1)
.
Since returns are computed in logs,
r
()
t+1 = log
(
P
(−1)
t+1
P
()
t
)
= Ar(τ)rt + A(τ)βt + C(τ) − (Ar(τ − 1)rt+1 + A(τ − 1)βt+1 + C(τ − 1)), (B.37)
where the second step follows from (7). Using (A.12) and (B.37), we can write (20) as
Ar(τ)rt + A(τ)βt + C(τ) − (Ar(τ − 1)rt+1 + A(τ − 1)βt+1 + C(τ − 1))
= a + bβt + c(Ar(1)rt + A(1)βt + C(1)) + ut+1. (B.38)
Because the processes (5) and (6) are linear, we can compute the conditional expectations of rt+1
and βt+1 as of date t by omitting the Brownian terms in (5) and (6), and solving the resulting
13ODEs from date t onwards. The solution to these ODEs is
βt′ =
(
1 − e−(t′−t)
)
¯ β + e−(t′−t)βt, (B.39)
rt′ =
(
1 − e−r(t′−t)
)
¯ r + e−r(t′−t)rt − κrγ
e−(t′−t) − e−r(t′−t)
κr − κ
βt, (B.40)
for t′ > t. Using (B.39) and (B.40), we can write (B.38) as
Ar(τ)rt + A(τ)βt + C(τ)
− Ar(τ − 1)
(
(
1 − e−r)
¯ r + e−rrt − κrγ
e− − e−r
κr − κ
βt
)
− A(τ − 1)
((
1 − e−) ¯ β + e−βt
)
− C(τ − 1) + vt+1
= a + bβt + c(Ar(1)rt + A(1)βt + C(1)) + ut+1, (B.41)
where vt+1 has zero conditional expectation as of date t. Subtracting (B.41) from its conditional
expectation as of date t, we ﬁnd ut+1 = vt+1. Identifying terms in rt, we ﬁnd
Ar(τ) − e−rAr(τ − 1) = cAr(1) ⇒ c = 1,
where the second step follows from (13). Identifying terms in βt, we ﬁnd
A(τ) − e−A(τ − 1) + κrγ
e− − e−r
κr − κ
Ar(τ − 1) = b + cA(1)
⇒ b = A(τ) − e−A(τ − 1) − A(1) + κrγ
e− − e−r
κr − κ
Ar(τ − 1).
Therefore, the coeﬃcients are as in the proposition’s statement.
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Appendix C: Additional Results and Data 
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    Statistical routine used to bootstrap p-values 
 
Data table  Data on bond supply used in the paper 
  Figure C.1 
Contribution of principal and coupons to construction of MWD 
 
The time-series average, for each maturity year, of total payments on bills, bonds, and notes scaled by GDP and 
multiplied by the maturity year. The bottom bars denote principal payments. The darker top bars denote coupon 
payments. Any payments beyond 30 years are included in the 30-year bucket. The data are based on the CRSP 
bond database and cover the period June 1952-December 2007.  
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Figure C.2 
Supply loadings 
 
Regression coefficients bτ from 30 monthly time-series regressions of the supply of bonds of maturity τ, scaled by GDP, 
on maturity-weighted debt to GDP.  
() (/ ) tt t D a b MWD GDP u

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The sample period is 1952-2007.  
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Yield spreads and excess returns 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form:  
() ( 1 )
() ( 1 )
,
tt t t
tk k t t tk
yyab X u
r y ab X u



 
 
 
The dependent variable is the yield spread or the one-year, three-year, or five-year excess return of the τ-year bond 
relative to the one-year bond. The independent variable Xt is MWD/GDP, the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio, or 
LTD/GDP, the long-term-debt-to-GDP ratio. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard 
errors with 36 lags in the case of the yield and one-year return regressions, and 54 and 90 lags in the case of the 
three- and five-year return regressions. 
 
 
  X=MWD/GDP X= LTD/GDP 
  b  [t] R
2 b [t] R
2
Yield spreads:      
Yield 2-year bond  0.001 [2.722] 0.117 0.031 [2.655] 0.113 
Yield 3-year bond  0.002 [2.620] 0.122 0.049 [2.566] 0.116 
Yield 4-year bond  0.003 [2.624] 0.133 0.065 [2.578] 0.126 
Yield 5-year bond  0.003 [2.512] 0.128 0.074 [2.513] 0.124 
Yield LT bond  0.005 [2.905] 0.156 0.13 [3.002] 0.158 
      
Returns:      
1-year return 2-year bond  0.004 [1.810] 0.042 0.103 [1.940] 0.047 
1-year return 3-year bond  0.006 [1.726] 0.038 0.175 [1.826] 0.041 
1-year return 4-year bond  0.009 [1.851] 0.040 0.247 [1.921] 0.042 
1-year return 5-year bond  0.011 [1.808] 0.036 0.290 [1.881] 0.037 
1-year return LT bond  0.025 [2.990] 0.082 0.658 [3.025] 0.081 
3-year return LT bond  0.067 [3.814] 0.188 1.849 [3.666] 0.201 
5-year return LT bond  0.107 [5.310] 0.253 3.002 [4.798] 0.282 
    Table C.2 
Yield spreads and excess returns, ARMA(1,k) standard errors 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form:  
() ( 1 )
() ( 1 )
,
tt t t
tk k t t tk
yyab X u
r y ab X u


 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the yield spread or the one-year, three-year, or five-year excess return of the τ-year bond relative to the one-year bond. The 
independent variable Xt  is  MWD/GDP, the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio, or LTD/GDP, the long-term-debt-to-GDP ratio. t-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on modeling the error process as AR(1) for the yield regressions, and as ARMA(1,k) for the return regressions where k denotes the 
number of months in the return cumulation (e.g., 12 for the one-year return).  
 
 
   X=MWD/GDP X= LTD/GDP 
   b [t] ρ SE b [t] ρ SE 
 Yield  spreads:       
 Yield  2-year  bond 0.001 [2.506] 0.859 AR(1) 0.031 [2.467] 0.862 AR(1) 
  Yield 3-year bond 0.002 [1.990] 0.914 AR(1) 0.049 [1.953] 0.916 AR(1) 
  Yield 4-year bond 0.003 [1.957] 0.924 AR(1) 0.065 [1.936] 0.926 AR(1) 
  Yield 5-year bond 0.003 [1.729] 0.937 AR(1) 0.074 [1.758] 0.937 AR(1) 
  Yield LT bond 0.005 [1.936] 0.946 AR(1) 0.130 [2.005] 0.946 AR(1) 
       
 Returns:     
  1-year return 2-year bond  0.004 [1.427] 0.936 AR(1,12) 0.103 [1.545] 0.932 AR(1,12) 
  1-year return 3-year bond  0.006 [1.534] 0.947 AR(1,12) 0.175 [1.621] 0.945 AR(1,12) 
  1-year return 4-year bond  0.009 [1.793] 0.953 AR(1,12) 0.247 [1.854] 0.949 AR(1,12) 
  1-year return 5-year bond  0.011 [1.950] 0.954 AR(1,12) 0.290 [2.000] 0.950 AR(1,12) 
  1-year return LT-bond  0.025 [3.808] 0.945 AR(1,12) 0.658 [3.808] 0.939 AR(1,12) 
  3-year return LT-bond  0.067 [4.472] 0.951 AR(1,36) 1.849 [4.682] 0.949 AR(1,36) 
  5-year return LT-bond  0.118 [3.034] 0.966 AR(1,60) 3.336 [3.413] 0.962 AR(1,60) 
     Table C.3 
Yields and returns, Newey-West + Block bootstrap p-values 
We show p-values from a stationary block bootstrap, for monthly time-series regressions of the form:  
() ( 1 )
() ( 1 )
,
tt t t
tk k t t tk
y ab X c y u
ra b X c y u



  
  
 
The dependent variable is the yield or the one-year, three-year, or five-year return of the τ-year bond. The 
independent variable Xt is MWD/GDP, the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio, or LTD/GDP, the long-term-debt-to-
GDP ratio. The regressions control for the one-year yield. In Panel A, we show all regressions for a blocklength of 
120. In Panel B, we show how the starred regression p-value changes as a function of the blocklength. 
Panel A. All regressions 
  X=MWD/GDP X= LTD/GDP 
  b  [t] [p-val] b [t] [p-val]
Yield spreads:         
Yield 2-year bond  0.001 [2.603] [0.060] 0.029 [2.482] [0.059]
Yield 3-year bond  0.002 [2.516] [0.062] 0.044 [2.369] [0.065]
Yield 4-year bond  0.002 [2.503] [0.067] 0.058 [2.361] [0.072]
Yield 5-year bond  0.002 [2.364] [0.079] 0.064 [2.263] [0.080]
Yield LT bond  0.004 [2.688] [0.067] 0.107 [2.616] [0.061]
Returns:      
1-year return 2-year bond  0.004 [1.983] [0.082] 0.116 [2.181] [0.059]
1-year return 3-year bond  0.007 [1.865] [0.111] 0.191 [2.017] [0.083]
1-year return 4-year bond  0.010 [1.969] [0.095] 0.266 [2.089] [0.075]
1-year return 5-year bond  0.011 [1.906] [0.098] 0.308 [2.017] [0.086]
1-year return LT-bond*  0.026 [3.104] [0.021] 0.685 [3.203] [0.025]
3-year return LT-bond  0.065 [4.209] [0.017] 1.786 [4.210] [0.020]
5-year return LT-bond  0.094 [5.433] [0.008] 2.626 [5.352] [0.006]
 
Panel B. Vary the blocklength in the regression 
() ( 1 )
1,1
LT
tt t t k ra b X c y u       
Block Length  p-value Block Length p-value 
12 [0.009] 156 [0.019] 
24 [0.006] 168 [0.020] 
36 [0.007] 180 [0.023] 
48 [0.012] 192 [0.020] 
60 [0.012] 204 [0.019] 
72 [0.014] 216 [0.018] 
84 [0.018] 228 [0.018] 
96 [0.016] 240 [0.020] 
108 [0.020] 252 [0.022] 
120 [0.021] 264 [0.019] 
132 [0.020] 276 [0.015] 
144 [0.022] 288 [0.017] Table C.4 
Horse-race regressions 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form:  
() ( 1 )
,
LT
tk k t t t tk ra b X c y d Z u       
The dependent variable is the yield or the one-year or three-year return of the long-term bond. The independent 
variable Xt is MWD/GDP, the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio. The independent variable Zt is D/GDP, the total-
debt-to-GDP ratio (Bohn 2008), or M, the dollar-weighted average maturity of debt. The regressions control for the 
one-year yield. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags in the 
case of the one-year return regression, and 54 lags in the case of the three-year return regression.  
 
1-yr ret  3-yr ret  1-yr ret  3-yr ret  1-yr ret  3-yr ret  1-yr ret  3-yr ret 
D/GDP  0.21 0.477  -0.095  -0.352 
[-1.832] [-1.461]  [-0.646] [-1.200] 
M  0.019 0.054  -0.027  -0.036 
[2.286] [3.381]  [-1.106]  [-0.686] 
MWD/GDP    0.031 0.086  0.051 0.099 
[2.437] [4.332]  [1.984] [1.836] 
y
(1)  1.508 4.384 1.049 3.133  1.154 3.606 1.244 3.781 
[2.842] [3.905] [1.870] [2.986] [2.594] [4.723] [2.905] [4.771] 
R
2  0.144 0.403 0.193 0.518 0.159 0.461 0.203 0.513 
 
 Table C.5 
Additional IV Regressions  
 
We repeat the instrumental variables specifications from Table 4 of the paper including each of the four measures of bond supply and each of three possible 
ways to measure the instrument, which is the debt to GDP ratio. MWD/GDP is the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio. Its market-valued based version 
multiplies the market value of each bond by Macaulay duration, sums across bonds, and scales by GDP. LTD/GDP is the long-term-debt-to-GDP ratio. Its 
market-value based version sums the market values of all bonds with maturity beyond ten years, and scales by GDP.  Debt to GDP is either the ratio of 
marketable Treasury debt to GDP, or the ratio of all Treasury debt listed on CRSP to GDP, or the ratio of total debt (Bohn 2008) to GDP. These three 
measures, although highly correlated, differ because some marketable bonds, such as TIPS, are not listed in the CRSP database, and because total debt 
includes some nonmarketable securities such as intra-governmental claims. The omitted first-stage regressions are shown in the next table (Table C.7).  
 
X = MWD/GDP  X =MWD/GDP (MV)  X=LTD/GDP  X=LTD/GDP (MV) 
Yield  1-yr ret  3-yr ret  Yield  1-yr ret  3-yr ret  Yield 1-yr  ret  3-yr  ret Yield  1-yr ret  3-yr ret 
Panel A: Instrument for X = Marketable Treasury Debt/GDP 
X (fitted)  0.002  0.028  0.067  0.001  0.007  0.016 0.058 0.763  1.815 0.106 1.395  3.317 
[t]  [1.129] [2.885] [3.493] [1.050] [2.671]  [3.110]  [1.129] [2.921] [3.575] [1.096] [2.837] [3.448] 
y  0.846 1.223 3.748 0.898 1.904 5.366 0.847 1.245 3.801 0.880 1.668 4.806 
[t]  [11.596] [2.868] [4.923] [8.413] [3.488] [4.855] [11.543] [2.902] [4.984] [9.760] [3.536] [5.566] 
Panel B: Instrument for X= Treasury Debt on CRSP/GDP 
X  (fitted) 0.002 0.026 0.061 0.001 0.006 0.015 0.057 0.711 1.654 0.105 1.309 3.043 
[t]  [1.085] [2.706] [3.080] [1.008] [2.490] [2.714] [1.085] [2.735] [3.128] [1.054] [2.659] [3.023] 
Y  0.845  1.214 3.720 0.896  1.841 5.179 0.847 1.235 3.769 0.879 1.632 4.693 
[t]  [11.559] [2.828] [4.831] [8.332] [3.363] [4.596]  [11.503] [2.859] [4.882] [9.650] [3.438] [5.301] 
Panel C: Instrument for X = Total Debt/GDP 
X (fitted)  0.000  0.021  0.046 0.000 0.004 0.009 -0.013 0.536 1.184 -0.022 0.903 1.995 
[t]  [0.180] [1.794] [1.668] [0.184] [1.632] [1.426] [0.181] [1.815] [1.657] [0.182] [1.766] [1.572] 
y  0.833 1.188  3.649 0.824 1.58 4.515 0.833 1.200 3.675 0.827 1.465 4.26 
[t]  [10.833] [2.673] [4.570] [7.682] [2.754] [3.832] [10.737] [2.679] [4.599] [8.484] [2.891] [4.467] 
 
  Table C.6 
Additional IV Regressions (First stage estimates) 
 
We show the first stage regressions from Table A9 above. Columns (1)-(4) are used in Panel A of Table C.9; Columns (5)-(8) are used in Panel B; 
Columns (9)-(12) are used in Panel C. 
 
MWD/ 
GDP 
MWD/ 
GDP 
(MV)
LTD/ 
GDP
LTD/ 
GDP 
(MV)
MWD/ 
GDP
MWD/ 
GDP 
(MV)
LTD/ 
GDP
LTD/ 
GDP 
(MV)
MWD/ 
GDP
MWD/ 
GDP 
(MV)
LTD/ 
GDP
LTD/ 
GDP 
(MV) 
D/GDP (Marketable)  14.186 58.363  0.527 0.288 
[t]  [13.390] [19.397] [12.683] [13.182] 
D/GDP (CRSP)  14.003 58.113  0.52  0.282 
[t]  [12.116] [17.362]  [11.331] [11.555] 
D/GDP (Bohn)  9.558 48.027  0.371  0.22 
[t]  [4.694] [13.219]  [5.351]  [6.982] 
y  12.809 -46.12  0.446 -0.059  12.217  -47.954  0.424 -0.073 13.757  -25.491  0.513  0.011 
[t]  [4.426] [4.183] [3.878] [0.811] [3.842] [4.618] [3.345] [0.954] [2.715] [2.690] [2.552] [0.100] 
N  667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 
R
2  0.835 0.919 0.813 0.816 0.832 0.926  0.81 0.806 0.554 0.908  0.59 0.727 
  Table C.7 
Arbitrageur wealth changes measured over different horizons 
 
Monthly time-series regressions of the form: 
() ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ()
, () () //
LT LT
tt tt t t k
LT Arb Arb
tk k t t t ab y y y y y u r MWD GDP c e W MWD GDP f W g
            
The dependent variable is the one-year return of the long-term bond. The independent variables include the spread between the long-term and the one-year 
yield, MWD/GDP, and interactions between these variables and changes in arbitrageur wealth. We use two measures of arbitrageur wealth. The first measure, 
∆W1
Arb, is the sum of wealth changes over the past k years, where the change in wealth over any given year is the product of the spread between the 
long-term and the one-year yield in the previous year, times the subsequent one-year excess return of the long-term bond. The second measure, ∆W2
Arb, is 
the sum of wealth changes over the past k years, where the change in wealth over any given year is the product of MWD/GDP in the previous year, times 
the subsequent one-year excess return of the long-term bond. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West standard errors with 36 lags in 
the case of the one-year return regression and 54 lags in the case of three-year return regression.  
 
  Forecast horizon: 1-year return 
Lookback period:  6 months  1 year  2 years   3 years 
MWD/GDP  0.027 0.017 0.031 0.034 0.032 0.042 0.031 0.047 
[3.076] [2.189] [3.408] [3.634] [3.392] [3.876] [3.008] [3.425] 
1 /
Arb W MWD GDP    -1.97 -4.729 -2.986 -1.742 
[-0.886] [-3.386] [-1.479] [-0.904] 
2 /
Arb W MWD GDP    0.035 -0.029 -0.030 -0.028 
[3.455] [-3.114]  [-3.226]  [-2.467] 
y
(1)  1.181 1.162 1.146 1.130 1.166 1.038 1.044 0.865 
  [2.673] [2.872] [2.587] [2.489] [2.359] [2.194] [2.091]  [1.811] 
R
2  0.192 0.256 0.239 0.238 0.204 0.239 0.170 0.213 
 
  Matlab Routine for Computing ARMA(p,q) standard errors for multivariate regressions 
 
The routine below makes use of the ARMAXFILTER routine provided by Kevin Sheppard in the MFE toolbox 
(http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/MFE_Toolbox). That routine estimates an ARMA(p,q) model from a column of time-series data. 
 
 
function [beta_out, se_arma, t_arma, se_ols, t_ols]=ols_arma_multi(y_1,x_1,p,q,x_2) 
  
if isempty(x_2) 
   x_part = [ones(T,1)]; 
else 
   x_part = [ones(T,1) x_2]; 
end 
  
K = size(x_part,2)+1; 
  
% Partial X_part from x_1 and y_1. In the case, where x_2 == [], this is simply demeaning; 
x=x_1 - x_part*inv(x_part'*x_part)*(x_part'*x_1); 
y=y_1 - x_part*inv(x_part'*x_part)*(x_part'*y_1); 
beta_out=inv(x'*x)*(x'*y); 
  
e=y-x*beta_out; 
se_ols=sqrt(diag(inv(x'*x))*((e'*e)/(T-K)));  % for comparison 
t_ols = beta_out./se_ols; 
  
xe=x.*e; 
  
xe=double(xe); 
[PARAMS, LL, ERRORS, SEREGRESSION, DIAGNOSTICS, VCVROBUST, VCV, LIKELIHOODS, SCORES]=armaxfilter(xe,1,p,q); 
  
% Fits ARMA(p,q) model (the first argument is a flag to denote whether to 
% include a constant 
 
PARAMS'; 
adj =  ( (1+sum(PARAMS(p+2:end)))^2  ) / (1-sum(PARAMS(2:p+1)))^2 ; 
OMEGA = adj*(ERRORS'*ERRORS); 
var_arma = (T/(T-K))*inv(x'*x)*OMEGA*inv(x'*x); 
se_arma=sqrt(diag(var_arma)); 
t_arma = beta_out./se_arma; Matlab Routine for Block Bootstrap 
 
function [b_nw, t_nw, pvalues_circ, pvalues_stat] = olsnw_boot(y,X,c,nwlags,NB,W) 
 
% Linear regression estimation with Newey-West HAC standard errors at Block-Bootstrapped p-values. 
% 
% USAGE: 
%   [b_nw, t_nw, pvalues_circ, pvalues_stat] = olsnw_boot(y,X,c,nwlags,NB,W) 
% 
% INPUTS: 
%   Y       - T by 1 vector of dependent data 
%   X       - T by K vector of independent data 
%   C       - [OPTIONAL] 1 or 0 to indicate whether a constant should be included (1: include 
%               constant). The default value is 1. 
%   NWLAGS  - [OPTIONAL] Number of lags to included in the covariance matrix estimator. If omitted 
%               or empty, NWLAGS = floor(T^(1/3)). If set to 0 estimates White's Heteroskedasticity 
%               Consistent variance-covariance. 
%   NB      - Number of bootstrap replications. 
%   W       - Width of block for moving block boostrap. For stationary bootstrap, this is the average block length. 
%             (Block lengths are draw from the geometric distribution with parameter p = 1/W 
% 
% OUTPUTS: 
%   b_bw          - A K(+1 is C=1) vector of parameters.  If a constant is included, it is the first parameter 
%   t_bw          - A K(+1) vector of t-statistics computed using Newey-West HAC standard errors 
%   pvalues_circ  - p-values from circular moving-blocks bootstrap 
%   pvalues_stat  - p-values from stationary block bootstrap 
 
% Reset random number generators to get the same results each time; 
reset(RandStream.getDefaultStream); 
 
% NW regression; 
% USAGE: [B,TSTAT,S2,VCVNW,R2,RBAR,YHAT] = olsnw(Y,X,C,NWLAGS) ; 
% INPUTS: Y T by 1 vector of dependent data ; 
% X T by K vector of independent data ; 
% C 1 or 0 to indicate whether a constant should be included (1: include constant) ; 
% NWLAGS Number of lags to included in the covariance matrix estimator. If omitted or empty, ; 
% NWLAGS = floor(T^(1/3)). If set to 0 estimates White’s Heteroskedasticity Consistent variancecovariance. ; 
 
T = size(X,1); 
if c == 1 
   K = size(X,2)+1; 
else    K = size(X,2); 
end 
 
if (c==1) 
 [betas,se,R2,R2adj,v,F_trash]  =olsgmm(y,[ones(T,1),X],nwlags,1); 
else 
 [betas,se,R2,R2adj,v,F_trash]  =olsgmm(y,X,nwlags,1); 
end 
b_nw=betas; 
t_nw=betas./se; 
 
% Code above replaces: 
% [b_nw,t_nw] = olsnw(y,X,c,nwlags); 
 
% Boostrap; 
indices = 1:T; 
indices = indices'; 
 
% Circular block bootstrap: creates a set of indices which can be used to run bootstrap; 
% [BSDATA, INDICES]=block_bootstrap(DATA,B,W) ; 
% INPUTS: DATA T by 1 vector of data to be bootstrapped ; 
% B Number of bootstraps ; 
% W Block length ; 
% BSDATA and INDICES are T x B matrices; 
 
bsindices_circ = block_bootstrap(indices,NB,W); 
if max(max(bsindices_circ)) > T 
   stop; 
end 
 
for i = 1:NB 
    y_star = y(bsindices_circ(:,i),:); 
    X_star = X(bsindices_circ(:,i),:); 
    [b_star,t_star,s2_star,vcvnw_star] = olsnw(y_star,X_star,c,nwlags); 
    tstat_star_circ(:,i) = (b_star - b_nw)./sqrt(diag(vcvnw_star)); 
end 
 
% Display and save p-value 
pvalues_circ = mean(abs(kron(t_nw,ones(1,NB))) < abs(tstat_star_circ),2); 
 
% Stationary block bootstrap: creates a set of indices which can be used to run bootstrap; 
% [BSDATA, INDICES]=stationary_bootstrap(DATA,B,W) ;  
bsindices_stat = stationary_bootstrap(indices,NB,W); 
if max(max(bsindices_stat)) > T 
   stop; 
end 
 
for i = 1:NB 
    y_star = y(bsindices_stat(:,i),:); 
    X_star = X(bsindices_stat(:,i),:); 
    [b_star,t_star,s2_star,vcvnw_star] = olsnw(y_star,X_star,c,nwlags); 
    tstat_star_stat(:,i) = (b_star - b_nw)./sqrt(diag(vcvnw_star)); 
end 
 
% Display and save p-value 
pvalues_stat = mean(abs(kron(t_nw,ones(1,NB))) < abs(tstat_star_stat),2); Table C8 
Data on the Maturity Structure of Government Debt 
 
GDP=Nominal GDP in billions of USD; MWD=Maturity weighted debt to GDP; LTD=Long-term debt/GDP (including all 
coupon payments). Calculation details in Greenwood and Vayanos (2012). Please email the authors for a complete 
dataset of the time-series used in the paper, as well as replication code. 
 
Date 
GDP 
(most 
recent 
Qtrly) 
FV all debt 
in CRSP 
($bn) MWD/GDP  LTD/GDP  Date 
GDP 
(most 
recent 
Qtrly) 
FV all debt 
in CRSP 
($bn) MWD/GDP  LTD/GDP 
            
195201       351        143   3.018  0.137  195601       428        163   2.540  0.093 
195202       351        151   3.022  0.137  195602       428        163   2.507  0.093 
195203       351        141   2.982  0.137  195603       428        159   2.502  0.093 
195204       352        142  2.949  0.136 195604     434      160   2.437 0.091
195205       352        143   2.913  0.136  195605       434        160   2.407  0.091 
195206       352        145   2.968  0.136  195606       434        155   2.376  0.091 
195207       359        144   2.805  0.114  195607       439        155   2.347  0.089 
195208       359        144   2.773  0.114  195608       439        157   2.321  0.089 
195209       359        143   2.771  0.114  195609       439        156   2.284  0.089 
195210       371        147  2.655  0.109 195610     448      158   2.210 0.087
195211       371        148   2.624  0.109  195611       448        159   2.197  0.087 
195212       371        148  2.589  0.109 195612     448      160   2.169 0.087
195301       378        148   2.508  0.097  195701       457        161   2.099  0.085 
195302       378        148   2.506  0.097  195702       457        161   2.100  0.085 
195303       378        146   2.473  0.097  195703       457        160   2.084  0.085 
195304       382        148   2.608  0.103  195704       459        160   2.046  0.084 
195305       382        148   2.588  0.103  195705       459        160   2.030  0.084 
195306       382        148  2.548  0.103 195706     459      159   2.006 0.084
195307       381        154   2.535  0.100  195707       466        170   2.004  0.078 
195308       381        154   2.510  0.100  195708       466        160   1.974  0.078 
195309       381        153   2.519  0.100  195709       466        162   1.994  0.079 
195310       376        153   2.520  0.101  195710       462        162   1.988  0.080 
195311       376        155   2.586  0.101  195711       462        164   2.027  0.081 
195312       376        155  2.553  0.101 195712     462      163   1.997 0.081
195401       375        155   2.523  0.100  195801       454        163   2.002  0.082 
195402       375        154   2.745  0.100  195802       454        164   2.239  0.089 
195403       375        150   2.718  0.100  195803       454        163   2.241  0.089 
195404       376        151   2.678  0.100  195804       458        166   2.238  0.088 
195405       376        153   2.718  0.100  195805       458        166   2.208  0.088 
195406       376        150  2.684  0.100 195806     458      167   2.383 0.091
195407       381        154   2.623  0.098  195807       472        168   2.308  0.088 
195408       381        154   2.665  0.098  195808       472        169   2.277  0.088 
195409       381        158   2.661  0.098  195809       472        170   2.249  0.088 
195410       389        158   2.568  0.095  195810       485        172   2.161  0.085 
195411       389        158   2.534  0.095  195811       485        177   2.172  0.085 
195412       389        158  2.688  0.095 195812     485      176   2.143 0.085
195501       403        158   2.566  0.091  195901       496        180   2.131  0.080 
195502       403        158   2.851  0.100  195902       496        179   2.136  0.080 
195503       403        156   2.820  0.101  195903       496        180   2.127  0.080 
195504       411        157   2.730  0.098  195904       509        180   2.059  0.079 
195505       411        158   2.716  0.098  195905       509        179   2.036  0.079 
195506       411        155  2.682  0.098 195906     509      178   2.008 0.079
195507       419        160   2.720  0.099  195907       509        183   2.046  0.071 
195508       419        159  2.708  0.099 195908     509      184   2.018 0.071
195509       419        159   2.679  0.099  195909       509        183   1.988  0.070 
195510       426        163   2.613  0.097  195910       513        188   1.972  0.070 
195511       426        174   2.618  0.097  195911       513        189   1.976  0.067 
195512       426        163   2.585  0.097  195912       513        188   1.954  0.067 
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Date 
GDP 
(most 
recent 
Qtrly) 
FV all debt 
in CRSP 
($bn) MWD/GDP  LTD/GDP  Date 
GDP 
(most 
recent 
Qtrly) 
FV all debt 
in CRSP 
($bn) MWD/GDP  LTD/GDP 
196001       527        190   1.877  0.058    196401       650        208   2.178  0.058 
196002       527        188   1.902  0.058    196402       650        209   2.174  0.058 
196003       527        185  1.873  0.058 196403     650      206   2.147 0.058
196004       526        187   1.895  0.050    196404       659        207   2.094  0.057 
196005       526        188  1.895  0.050 196405     659      209   2.119 0.059
196006       526        184   1.890  0.050    196406       659        204   2.091  0.056 
196007       529        187   1.858  0.049    196407       671        206   2.201  0.058 
196008       529        185   1.862  0.049    196408       671        207   2.186  0.058 
196009       529        188   2.150  0.060    196409       671        206   2.161  0.058 
196010       524        191   2.187  0.063    196410       676        209   2.121  0.058 
196011       524        189  2.174  0.063 196411     676      211   2.118 0.058
196012       524        189   2.144  0.063    196412       676        212   2.095  0.054 
196101       528        189   2.096  0.062    196501       696        214   2.219  0.058 
196102       528        190   2.090  0.062    196502       696        214   2.199  0.058 
196103       528        193   2.138  0.062    196503       696        209   2.170  0.057 
196104       539        188   2.049  0.055    196504       708        212   2.108  0.056 
196105       539        189  2.041  0.055 196505     708      210   2.124 0.056
196106       539        187   2.012  0.055    196506       708        207   2.101  0.056 
196107       550        193   2.007  0.054    196507       725        208   2.028  0.055 
196108       550        190   1.978  0.054    196508       725        207   2.026  0.055 
196109       550        192   2.178  0.065    196509       725        208   2.003  0.054 
196110       563        195   2.113  0.063    196510       748        212   1.924  0.053 
196111       563        195  2.128  0.064 196511     748      213   1.923 0.053
196112       563        196   2.104  0.064    196512       748        215   1.900  0.052 
196201       576        198   2.047  0.062    196601       771        218   1.822  0.051 
196202       576        198   2.068  0.062    196602       771        218   1.854  0.051 
196203       576        196   2.229  0.066    196603       771        215   1.832  0.050 
196204       583        198   2.192  0.065    196604       780        215   1.787  0.050 
196205       583        198  2.220  0.065 196605     780      212   1.781 0.050
196206       583        196   2.191  0.064    196606       780        209   1.759  0.049 
196207       590        196   2.141  0.061    196607       793        209   1.708  0.048 
196208       590        199   2.179  0.062    196608       793        210   1.725  0.048 
196209       590        200  2.247  0.062    196609       793        211   1.704  0.048 
196210       593        201   2.210  0.058    196610       807        215   1.656  0.047 
196211       593        202  2.243  0.058 196611     807      213   1.639 0.047
196212       593        202  2.217  0.058    196612       807        218   1.632  0.047 
196301       603        204  2.180  0.053 196701     818      218   1.589 0.046
196302       603        204  2.187  0.053    196702       818        218   1.590  0.046 
196303       603        203  2.265  0.057    196703       818        222   1.570  0.046 
196304       611        203  2.234  0.057    196704       822        219   1.539  0.045 
196305       611        204  2.231  0.057    196705       822        217   1.564  0.045 
196306       611        203  2.229  0.057    196706       822        211   1.543  0.045 
196307       624        202  2.159  0.056 196707     837      215   1.499 0.044
196308       624        204  2.146  0.056    196708       837        218   1.507  0.044 
196309       624        204  2.290  0.059    196709       837        217   1.485  0.044 
196310       634        204  2.230  0.058    196710       853        222   1.442  0.043 
196311       634        206  2.225  0.058    196711       853        226   1.455  0.043 
196312       634        205  2.198  0.058    196712       853        226   1.433  0.043 
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Date 
GDP 
(most 
recent 
Qtrly) 
FV all debt 
in CRSP 
($bn) MWD/GDP  LTD/GDP  Date 
GDP 
(most 
recent 
Qtrly) 
FV all debt 
in CRSP 
($bn) MWD/GDP  LTD/GDP 
196801       880        228  1.371  0.041    197201    1,190        262   0.921  0.023 
196802       880        233  1.405  0.041 197202  1,190      257   0.936 0.025
196803       880        231   1.383  0.041    197203    1,190        261   0.919  0.022 
196804       904        226  1.326  0.040    197204    1,226        259   0.880  0.022 
196805       904        232  1.377  0.040    197205    1,226        256   0.873  0.022 
196806       904        226  1.356  0.040    197206    1,226        257   0.859  0.021 
196807       919        229  1.318  0.039    197207    1,249        257   0.827  0.021 
196808       919        232  1.378  0.039 197208  1,249      258   0.881 0.023
196809       919        233  1.358  0.039    197209    1,249        256   0.865  0.023 
196810       936        236  1.317  0.038    197210    1,287        257   0.830  0.022 
196811       936        235  1.328  0.038    197211    1,287        263   0.827  0.022 
196812       936        235  1.309  0.038    197212    1,287        268   0.816  0.022 
196901       961        238  1.257  0.036    197301    1,335        267   0.788  0.022 
196902       961        227  1.270  0.036 197302  1,335      265   0.795 0.022
196903       961        231   1.262  0.036    197303    1,335        268   0.779  0.021 
196904       976        230  1.224  0.035 197304  1,372      265   0.745 0.021
196905       976        232  1.232  0.035    197305    1,372        263   0.802  0.022 
196906       976        225  1.213  0.035    197306    1,372        259   0.787  0.022 
196907       996        229  1.174  0.034    197307    1,391        261   0.763  0.020 
196908       996        228  1.160  0.034    197308    1,391        260   0.783  0.021 
196909       996        220  1.142  0.034    197309    1,391        262   0.772  0.021 
196910    1,005        235  1.146  0.034 197310  1,432      262   0.736 0.020
196911    1,005        237  1.128  0.034    197311    1,432        270   0.750  0.021 
196912    1,005        234  1.111  0.033    197312    1,432        268   0.736  0.021 
197001    1,017        235  1.079  0.033    197401    1,447        268   0.715  0.020 
197002    1,017        234  1.088  0.033    197402    1,447        269   0.733  0.021 
197003    1,017        236  1.072  0.030    197403    1,447        273   0.720  0.021 
197004    1,033        234  1.037  0.029 197404  1,485      266   0.688 0.020
197005    1,033        236  1.081  0.029    197405    1,485        268   0.710  0.021 
197006    1,033        229  1.063  0.029    197406    1,485        264   0.696  0.021 
197007    1,051        237  1.032  0.029    197407    1,514        265   0.671  0.020 
197008    1,051        240  1.051  0.029    197408    1,514        270   0.722  0.021 
197009    1,051        237  1.034  0.028    197409    1,514        271   0.713  0.020 
197010    1,053        242  1.016  0.028 197410  1,553      272   0.684 0.019
197011    1,053        244  1.036  0.028    197411    1,553        276   0.726  0.020 
197012    1,053        247  1.019  0.026    197412    1,553        277   0.721  0.020 
197101    1,098        245  0.959  0.025    197501    1,569        285   0.707  0.020 
197102    1,098        247  1.036  0.025    197502    1,569        288   0.743  0.021 
197103    1,098        243  1.018  0.025    197503    1,569        300   0.749  0.021 
197104    1,119        242  0.983  0.024 197504  1,605      302   0.743 0.022
197105    1,119        239  0.981  0.024    197505    1,605        313   0.829  0.024 
197106    1,119        239  0.968  0.024    197506    1,605        316   0.821  0.023 
197107    1,139        245  0.935  0.023    197507    1,662        324   0.787  0.022 
197108    1,139        247  0.948  0.024    197508    1,662        331   0.836  0.023 
197109    1,139        250  0.937  0.023    197509    1,662        333   0.832  0.023 
197110    1,151        251  0.917  0.023 197510  1,714      351   0.808 0.022
197111    1,151        255  0.988  0.024    197511    1,714        356   0.844  0.024 
197112    1,151        262  0.972  0.024 197512  1,714      357   0.833 0.023
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197601    1,772        369  0.807  0.023    198001    2,724        536   1.291  0.043 
197602    1,772        379  0.868  0.023 198002  2,724      537   1.375 0.047
197603    1,772        379  0.864  0.023    198003    2,724        554   1.375  0.045 
197604    1,804        384  0.843  0.023    198004    2,728        552   1.377  0.046 
197605    1,804        386  0.894  0.027    198005    2,728        562   1.470  0.049 
197606    1,804        387  0.892  0.023    198006    2,728        567   1.474  0.048 
197607    1,838        398  0.869  0.023    198007    2,785        576   1.446  0.048 
197608    1,838        398  0.973  0.030 198008  2,785      583   1.507 0.052
197609    1,838        408  0.967  0.024    198009    2,785        587   1.510  0.050 
197610    1,885        409  0.935  0.023    198010    2,915        595   1.440  0.048 
197611    1,885        409  0.967  0.024    198011    2,915        601   1.513  0.052 
197612    1,885        421   0.962  0.024    198012    2,915        611   1.518  0.050 
197701    1,939        424  0.927  0.023    198101    3,051        629   1.466  0.049 
197702    1,939        432  0.977  0.024 198102  3,051      643   1.549 0.052
197703    1,939        435  0.971  0.024    198103    3,051        653   1.552  0.052 
197704    2,005        431  0.931  0.023 198104  3,084      658   1.558 0.053
197705    2,005        425  1.004  0.026    198105    3,084        657   1.624  0.056 
197706    2,005        431   0.996  0.025    198106    3,084        652   1.625  0.055 
197707    2,066        430  0.968  0.026    198107    3,177        666   1.600  0.054 
197708    2,066        432  1.014  0.027    198108    3,177        674   1.675  0.058 
197709    2,066        443  1.010  0.027    198109    3,177        674   1.674  0.057 
197710    2,111        447  0.985  0.026 198110  3,195      690   1.687 0.058
197711    2,111        449  1.043  0.029    198111    3,195        705   1.766  0.062 
197712    2,111        460  1.036  0.028    198112    3,195        720   1.765  0.060 
197801    2,149        461   1.025  0.028    198201    3,185        727   1.789  0.061 
197802    2,149        465  1.092  0.030    198202    3,185        738   1.870  0.065 
197803    2,149        475  1.086  0.030    198203    3,185        743   1.871  0.064 
197804    2,275        469  1.017  0.028 198204  3,241      756   1.833 0.063
197805    2,275        468  1.079  0.032    198205    3,241        756   1.845  0.064 
197806    2,275        478  1.073  0.030    198206    3,241        754   1.840  0.062 
197807    2,335        481   1.052  0.031    198207    3,274        774   1.823  0.061 
197808    2,335        486  1.126  0.033    198208    3,274        792   1.849  0.061 
197809    2,335        485  1.114  0.033    198209    3,274        824   1.905  0.061 
197810    2,416        486  1.083  0.032 198210  3,313      825   1.854 0.060
197811    2,416        493  1.168  0.037    198211    3,313        837   1.936  0.064 
197812    2,416        488  1.151  0.035    198212    3,313        881   1.941  0.062 
197901    2,463        491   1.140  0.035    198301    3,381        889   1.935  0.063 
197902    2,463        492  1.218  0.038    198302    3,381        908   2.038  0.068 
197903    2,463        497  1.208  0.038    198303    3,381        938   2.042  0.065 
197904    2,526        502  1.182  0.038 198304  3,482      935   2.011 0.065
197905    2,526        507  1.247  0.041    198305    3,482        945   2.111  0.070 
197906    2,526        499  1.229  0.040    198306    3,482        979   2.113  0.068 
197907    2,600        501   1.203  0.039    198307    3,587        986   2.082  0.068 
197908    2,600        509  1.272  0.042    198308    3,587        998   2.222  0.074 
197909    2,600        507  1.261  0.041    198309    3,587     1,024   2.223  0.071 
197910    2,659        509  1.243  0.041 198310  3,688   1,035   2.196 0.071
197911    2,659        520  1.320  0.045    198311    3,688     1,025   2.312  0.077 
197912    2,659        525  1.319  0.044 198312  3,688   1,051   2.300 0.074
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198401    3,807     1,070   2.278  0.074    198801    4,949     1,702   3.543  0.121 
198402    3,807     1,088   2.404  0.078 198802  4,949   1,729   3.668 0.128
198403    3,807     1,098   2.388  0.077    198803    4,949     1,742   3.653  0.125 
198404    3,906     1,123   2.376  0.077    198804    5,059     1,728   3.548  0.122 
198405    3,906     1,131   2.501  0.083    198805    5,059     1,746   3.677  0.129 
198406    3,906     1,127   2.484  0.080    198806    5,059     1,753   3.660  0.125 
198407    3,976     1,144   2.495  0.082    198807    5,143     1,745   3.575  0.123 
198408    3,976     1,185   2.619  0.088 198808  5,143   1,744   3.588 0.126
198409    3,976     1,177   2.599  0.085    198809    5,143     1,780   3.574  0.122 
198410    4,034     1,186   2.609  0.086    198810    5,251     1,795   3.481  0.120 
198411    4,034     1,214   2.740  0.093    198811    5,251     1,807   3.605  0.127 
198412    4,034     1,233   2.739  0.089    198812    5,251     1,805   3.578  0.123 
198501    4,117     1,258   2.720  0.090    198901    5,360     1,830   3.497  0.120 
198502    4,117     1,273   2.851  0.097 198902  5,360   1,844   3.624 0.127
198503    4,117     1,270   2.831  0.094    198903    5,360     1,856   3.610  0.124 
198504    4,176     1,286   2.837  0.095 198904  5,454   1,842   3.524 0.122
198505    4,176     1,313   2.971  0.101    198905    5,454     1,847   3.653  0.129 
198506    4,176     1,308   2.949  0.098    198906    5,454     1,861   3.636  0.125 
198507    4,258     1,327   2.937  0.098    198907    5,533     1,857   3.562  0.123 
198508    4,258     1,345   3.075  0.105    198908    5,533     1,874   3.687  0.130 
198509    4,258     1,357   3.063  0.102    198909    5,533     1,861   3.658  0.127 
198510    4,319     1,364   2.995  0.101 198910  5,582   1,915   3.620 0.126
198511    4,319     1,395   3.181  0.110    198911    5,582     1,942   3.745  0.132 
198512    4,319     1,407   3.177  0.106    198912    5,582     1,929   3.716  0.129 
198601    4,382     1,433   3.159  0.107    199001    5,708     1,944   3.624  0.126 
198602    4,382     1,447   3.283  0.113    199002    5,708     1,960   3.749  0.133 
198603    4,382     1,455   3.272  0.110    199003    5,708     1,980   3.721  0.129 
198604    4,423     1,450   3.226  0.109 199004  5,797   1,986   3.655 0.127
198605    4,423     1,470   3.362  0.117    199005    5,797     2,009   3.780  0.134 
198606    4,423     1,495   3.356  0.113    199006    5,797     2,012   3.751  0.130 
198607    4,491     1,508   3.290  0.112    199007    5,851     2,053   3.710  0.129 
198608    4,491     1,516   3.427  0.117    199008    5,851     2,099   3.841  0.136 
198609    4,491     1,524   3.422  0.116    199009    5,851     2,078   3.812  0.132 
198610    4,543     1,550   3.355  0.114 199010  5,846   2,107   3.806 0.132
198611    4,543     1,574   3.504  0.122    199011    5,846     2,168   3.943  0.139 
198612    4,543     1,587   3.497  0.118    199012    5,846     2,181   3.925  0.136 
198701    4,611     1,595   3.424  0.116    199101    5,880     2,207   3.893  0.135 
198702    4,611     1,605   3.562  0.121    199102    5,880     2,242   4.028  0.142 
198703    4,611     1,604   3.554  0.120    199103    5,880     2,213   3.986  0.138 
198704    4,687     1,622   3.479  0.118 199104  5,962   2,223   3.931 0.136
198705    4,687     1,623   3.620  0.126    199105    5,962     2,263   4.083  0.144 
198706    4,687     1,628   3.612  0.122    199106    5,962     2,253   4.041  0.140 
198707    4,765     1,634   3.534  0.120    199107    6,034     2,284   3.997  0.138 
198708    4,765     1,669   3.674  0.128    199108    6,034     2,332   4.133  0.146 
198709    4,765     1,635   3.650  0.125    199109    6,034     2,376   4.121  0.141 
198710    4,883     1,676   3.549  0.122 199110  6,093   2,414   4.070 0.140
198711    4,883     1,699   3.629  0.126    199111    6,093     2,424   4.198  0.147 
198712    4,883     1,708   3.615  0.123 199112  6,093   2,435   4.184 0.143
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199201    6,191     2,471   4.105  0.141    199601    7,638     3,305   3.684  0.124 
199202    6,191     2,478   4.204  0.145 199602  7,638   3,372   3.790 0.130
199203    6,191     2,537   4.193  0.144    199603    7,638     3,360   3.746  0.126 
199204    6,295     2,539   4.113  0.141    199604    7,800     3,385   3.661  0.123 
199205    6,295     2,558   4.215  0.148    199605    7,800     3,372   3.673  0.125 
199206    6,295     2,590   4.203  0.144    199606    7,800     3,370   3.648  0.122 
199207    6,390     2,623   4.132  0.142    199607    7,893     3,393   3.619  0.124 
199208    6,390     2,657   4.240  0.148 199608  7,893   3,417   3.686 0.124
199209    6,390     2,639   4.212  0.144    199609    7,893     3,403   3.659  0.122 
199210    6,494     2,646   4.116  0.142    199610    8,023     3,442   3.614  0.123 
199211    6,494     2,719   4.244  0.146    199611    8,023     3,478   3.682  0.124 
199212    6,494     2,739   4.219  0.144    199612    8,023     3,479   3.658  0.123 
199301    6,545     2,730   4.156  0.143    199701    8,137     3,460   3.580  0.121 
199302    6,545     2,757   4.256  0.149 199702  8,137   3,489   3.661 0.126
199303    6,545     2,757   4.242  0.145    199703    8,137     3,511   3.634  0.122 
199304    6,623     2,782   4.178  0.143 199704  8,277   3,475   3.545 0.120
199305    6,623     2,795   4.245  0.146    199705    8,277     3,428   3.548  0.122 
199306    6,623     2,783   4.233  0.144    199706    8,277     3,414   3.520  0.119 
199307    6,688     2,813   4.151  0.143    199707    8,410     3,394   3.437  0.117 
199308    6,688     2,878   4.275  0.149    199708    8,410     3,421   3.513  0.121 
199309    6,688     2,890   4.247  0.145    199709    8,410     3,411   3.485  0.118 
199310    6,814     2,909   4.141  0.142 199710  8,506   3,420   3.421 0.117
199311    6,814     2,963   4.153  0.142    199711    8,506     3,526   3.497  0.120 
199312    6,814     2,974   4.126  0.139    199712    8,506     3,450   3.468  0.119 
199401    6,916     2,971   4.037  0.137    199801    8,601     3,403   3.402  0.117 
199402    6,916     3,002   4.137  0.143    199802    8,601     3,429   3.477  0.122 
199403    6,916     3,028   4.111  0.139    199803    8,601     3,449   3.451  0.119 
199404    7,044     3,036   4.011  0.137 199804  8,699   3,345   3.384 0.118
199405    7,044     3,048   4.020  0.139    199805    8,699     3,329   3.384  0.119 
199406    7,044     3,036   3.994  0.135    199806    8,699     3,316   3.352  0.116 
199407    7,132     3,051   3.918  0.133    199807    8,847     3,277   3.267  0.114 
199408    7,132     3,075   4.032  0.139    199808    8,847     3,311   3.337  0.117 
199409    7,132     3,077   4.004  0.135    199809    8,847     3,258   3.304  0.116 
199410    7,248     3,108   3.913  0.133 199810  9,028   3,263   3.208 0.113
199411    7,248     3,124   3.924  0.135    199811    9,028     3,294   3.271  0.117 
199412    7,248     3,143   3.898  0.131    199812    9,028     3,300   3.242  0.114 
199501    7,308     3,172   3.840  0.129    199901    9,149     3,241   3.166  0.113 
199502    7,308     3,210   3.951  0.136    199902    9,149     3,249   3.228  0.115 
199503    7,308     3,230   3.925  0.132    199903    9,149     3,298   3.198  0.114 
199504    7,356     3,216   3.871  0.131 199904  9,253   3,185   3.131 0.113
199505    7,356     3,215   3.880  0.133    199905    9,253     3,173   3.133  0.114 
199506    7,356     3,237   3.852  0.129    199906    9,253     3,150   3.102  0.111 
199507    7,453     3,256   3.774  0.127    199907    9,405     3,137   3.023  0.109 
199508    7,453     3,271   3.883  0.133    199908    9,405     3,174   3.095  0.113 
199509    7,453     3,276   3.854  0.128    199909    9,405     3,137   3.065  0.111 
199510    7,543     3,278   3.779  0.127 199910  9,608   3,128   2.973 0.108
199511    7,543     3,336   3.787  0.129    199911    9,608     3,141   2.973  0.108 
199512    7,543     3,324   3.759  0.126 199912  9,608   3,191   2.946 0.107
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200001 
     
9,710     3,104   2.887  0.106 200401
     
11,590   3,419   1.934 0.067
200002 
     
9,710     3,110   2.950  0.110    200402 
     
11,590     3,511   1.960  0.070 
200003 
     
9,710     3,153   2.925  0.107    200403 
     
11,590     3,572   1.948  0.066 
200004 
     
9,949     3,021   2.809  0.103    200404 
     
11,763     3,519   1.907  0.065 
200005 
     
9,949     2,992   2.778  0.102    200405 
     
11,763     3,573   1.930  0.068 
200006 
     
9,949     2,947   2.743  0.100    200406 
     
11,763     3,598   1.918  0.064 
200007     10,018     2,917   2.680  0.099 200407
     
11,936   3,606    1.878 0.063
200008     10,018     2,939   2.704  0.101 200408
     
11,936   3,647    1.898 0.066
200009     10,018     2,892   2.672  0.098    200409 
     
11,936     3,646   1.887  0.062 
200010     10,130     2,873   2.604  0.097    200410 
     
12,124     3,681   1.845  0.061 
200011     10,130     2,916   2.595  0.096    200411 
     
12,124     3,737   1.864  0.063 
200012     10,130     2,862   2.561  0.094    200412 
     
12,124     3,723   1.852  0.060 
200101     10,165     2,852   2.517  0.094    200501 
     
12,362     3,717   1.803  0.059 
200102     10,165     2,860   2.568  0.097 200502
     
12,362   3,801   1.819 0.061
200103     10,165     2,866   2.530  0.094    200503 
     
12,362     3,845   1.808  0.057 
200104     10,301     2,747   2.456  0.092    200504 
     
12,500     3,786   1.774  0.057 
200105     10,301     2,727   2.447  0.091 200505
     
12,500   3,776    1.790 0.059
200106     10,301     2,710   2.419  0.090    200506 
     
12,500     3,746   1.776  0.056 
200107     10,305     2,721   2.382  0.089    200507 
     
12,729     3,775   1.730  0.055 
200108     10,305     2,797   2.401  0.091    200508 
     
12,729     3,837   1.743  0.057 
200109     10,305     2,785   2.380  0.089 200509
     
12,729   3,785    1.729 0.054
200110     10,373     2,785   2.342  0.088    200510 
     
12,901     3,817   1.691  0.053 
200111     10,373     2,857   2.339  0.087    200511 
     
12,901     3,896   1.704  0.055 
200112     10,373     2,851   2.307  0.085 200512
     
12,901   3,828    1.689 0.052
200201     10,499     2,826   2.261  0.084    200601 
     
13,161     3,857   1.641  0.051 
200202     10,499     2,890   2.264  0.086    200602 
     
13,161     3,952   1.713  0.055 
200203     10,499     2,871   2.242  0.083    200603 
     
13,161     3,998   1.701  0.052 200204     10,602     2,851   2.199  0.082    200604 
     
13,330     3,931   1.665  0.052 
200205     10,602     2,904   2.202  0.082    200605 
     
13,330     3,913   1.678  0.054 
200206     10,602     2,880   2.178  0.081    200606 
     
13,330     3,883   1.666  0.050 
200207     10,702     2,964   2.147  0.080 200607
     
13,433   3,904    1.647 0.049
200208     10,702     3,018   2.166  0.082    200608 
     
13,433     3,967   1.698  0.053 
200209     10,702     3,042   2.157  0.079    200609 
     
13,433     3,925   1.685  0.050 
200210     10,767     3,064   2.126  0.079 200610
     
13,584   3,930    1.652 0.050
200211     10,767     3,085   2.131  0.081    200611 
     
13,584     3,984   1.665  0.052 
200212     10,767     3,080   2.113  0.077    200612 
     
13,584     3,946   1.651  0.048 
200301     10,887     3,067   2.073  0.076    200701 
     
13,759     3,964   1.616  0.047 
200302     10,887     3,142   2.090  0.078    200702 
     
13,759     4,015   1.662  0.050 
200303     10,887     3,187   2.073  0.075    200703 
     
13,759     4,069   1.650  0.048 
200304     11,012     3,169   2.030  0.074    200704 
     
13,977     3,985   1.608  0.047 
200305     11,012     3,227   2.055  0.076 200705
     
13,977   3,958    1.647 0.050
200306     11,012     3,248   2.036  0.074    200706 
     
13,977     3,919   1.632  0.047 
200307     11,255     3,248   1.974  0.072    200707 
     
14,126     3,957   1.601  0.046 
200308     11,255     3,335   2.009  0.075    200708 
     
14,126     4,057   1.665  0.050 
200309     11,255     3,316   1.997  0.070    200709 
     
14,126     4,008   1.650  0.047 
200310     11,415     3,366   1.959  0.069    200710 
     
14,253     3,946   1.621  0.046 
200311     11,415     3,426   1.986  0.072 200711
     
14,253   4,095    1.656 0.049
200312     11,415     3,441   1.975  0.068    200712 
     
14,253     4,070   1.641  0.047 
                 
 